Appeals from First Circuit Court; Honorable Yoshimi Hayashi, Judge.
Richardson, C.J., Ogata, Menor, Lum, JJ., and Retired Justice Marumoto, Assigned by Reason of Vacancy. Opinion of the Court by Lum, J.
This appeal questions the authority of the trial court to revoke the probation of both appellants, James Otis Palama and Henderson K. Ahlo, Jr., under § 706-628, Hawaii Revised Statutes.
Sometime during the year 1977, both appellants, in separate criminal proceedings, were convicted and sentenced to five years probation. On May 31, 1978, while on probation, both appellants were jointly tried and convicted of murder under HRS § 707-701 and hindering prosecution under HRS § 710-1029, and both appealed their convictions. Immediately following their latest convictions, the State moved to revoke appellants' probations and to have them resentenced.
The trial court, after being satisfied that appellants had been sentenced for their May 31 convictions, granted the State's motion to revoke and sentenced each appellant to five years imprisonment.
Two specific contentions are made by appellants. First, they claim that since the underlying offenses (or criminal acts) which formed the basis for their May 31 convictions occurred on July 29, 1977, a date before appellants were placed on probation,*fn1 the trial court was without authority to revoke their probations, and, secondly, even assuming that the trial court had the authority to revoke their probations, because their convictions were being appealed and not final,*fn2 the revocation orders cannot stand.
HRS § 706-628 states the following:
(1) At any time before the discharge of the defendant or the termination of the period of probation or suspension of sentence, the court, if satisfied that the defendant has inexcusably failed to comply with a substantial requirement imposed as a condition of the order or if he has been convicted of another crime, may revoke the suspension or probation and sentence or resentence the defendant, as provided in subsection (2). (Emphasis added.)
(2) When the court revokes a suspension or probation, it may impose on the defendant any sentence that might have been imposed originally for the crime of which he was convicted.
It is well settled and established in this jurisdiction that:
[W]here there is no ambiguity in the language of a statute, and the literal application of the language would not produce an absurd or unjust result, clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the statute, there is no room for judicial construction and interpretation, and the ...