The opinion of the court was delivered by: Helen Gillmor United States District Judge
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION AS TIME-BARRED AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before the court is William Alston's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Alston is proceeding pro se. Respondent has filed a preliminary Answer to the Petition. ECF #10. Alston has filed a Reply. ECF #15. Both parties have filed court-ordered supplemental briefs, ECF #19, #20, & #22, and Alston filed a rebuttal to Respondent's supplemental brief, ECF #23. Because the Petition is time-barred and Petitioner is not entitled to equitable or statutory tolling, it is DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), and a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED.
On September 15, 2006, Alston was convicted by jury trial in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii ("circuit court"), of attempted murder in the second degree (Count 1); kidnapping (Counts 2, 4, 6, and 11); terroristic threatening in the first degree (Count 5); and abuse of a family or household member (Count 13). ECF #10-3, App. B. Judgment of conviction and sentence was entered on January 24, 2007. Id.
On February 13, 2007, the circuit court denied the State's motions for extended and consecutive terms of imprisonment, but granted the State's motions for imposition of mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for offenses against the elderly and as a repeat offender. ECF #10-4, App. C. The circuit court issued an amended judgment on March 7, 2007. See ECF #10-5, App. D at 9.
The Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals ("ICA") affirmed Alston's sentence and conviction on March 31, 2009, in No. 28410. ECF #10-8, App. G. Judgment on Appeal was entered on April 27, 2009. ECF #10-9, App. H. The Hawaii Supreme Court rejected Alston's application for certiorari on August 27, 2009. Doc. #10-11, App. J. Alston did not seek certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, nor has he pursued post-conviction relief in the state courts.
On January 17, 2011, Alston signed his "Motion to File Late 2254 Petition," and mailed it to this court the next day. The court received and filed the Motion on January 24, 2011. ECF #1. In the Motion, Alston stated that he was in administrative segregation, was not allowed help from other inmates, had been subject to several prison lockdowns, and was unschooled in "legal procedures, protocol, and administration on how to file petitions, and motions [which] caused me to find out recently of my tardiness to file a Federal Habeas Corpus Petition." ECF #1 at 1. The court granted the Motion and notified Alston that, although it initiated an action based on his request, it made no determination whether the forthcoming petition would be timely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244. ECF #3. On February 18, 2011, Alston signed the Petition and Memorandum in Support. See ECF #7 & #8. These documents were mailed from Arizona on February 23, 2011, and received and filed on February 24, 2011.
Alston raises four grounds for relief: (1) prosecutorial misconduct (Ground One); (2) denial of the right to counsel (Ground Two); (3) denial of the right to confront witnesses (Ground Three); and (4) trial court error in admitting prejudicial statements at trial (Ground Four).
On April 24, 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") altered the time limit imposed on state prisoners filing habeas corpus petitions in federal court. AEDPA established a one-year period in which to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitation period runs from the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing such by State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through ...