Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Dion'e Kaeo-Tomaselli, #A5004463 v. Pi'ikoi Recovery House For Women

November 16, 2011

DION'E KAEO-TOMASELLI, #A5004463, PLAINTIFF,
v.
PI'IKOI RECOVERY HOUSE FOR WOMEN, MR. JOE CHAVEZ, MS. EVALANI SOUZA, DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Leslie E. Kobayashi United States District Judge

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT IN PART

Before the court is pro se Plaintiff Dion'e KaeoTomaselli's ("Plaintiff") prisoner civil rights complaint.*fn1

Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Women's Community Correctional Center ("WCCC"). Plaintiff names the Pi'ikoi Recovery House for Women ("Pi'ikoi House"), Joe Chavez ("Chavez"), and Evalani Souza ("Souza") as defendants (collectively, "Defendants"). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied her public accommodation in housing on the basis of her gender in violation of her federal constitutional and statutory rights. Plaintiff also alleges that Souza slandered her.

The court has screened the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915(A)(b)(1). Defendants Pi'ikoi House and Chavez are DISMISSED for Plaintiff's failure to state a claim against them. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the Complaint, if possible, to cure its deficiencies.

I. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS

Plaintiff alleges that, on August 10, 2010, Souza informed an unidentified "witness" by telephone that she would not accept Plaintiff into Pi'ikoi House*fn2 as a resident because former residents had told Souza that Plaintiff "was a sex change." Compl. at 5. Plaintiff states that this is "false information . . . and for all intent[s] and purposes I am a female." Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges that Souza's statements and refusal to accommodate her were discriminatory and slanderous. Plaintiff further claims that Chavez is liable for Souza's allegedly discriminatory acts because he is the Head Supervisor at Oxford House, Inc., and he failed to properly train Souza.*fn3 Plaintiff seeks compensation for her emotional and psychological trauma and payment for her psychological therapy.

II. STATUTORY SCREENING

The court must screen all civil actions brought by prisoners that relate to prison conditions and/or seek redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if its claims are legally frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (c)(1).

A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a claim for (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To state a claim, a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, ----, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.

"[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff's specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there are other "more likely explanations" for a defendant's conduct. Id. at 1951.

The court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, accept all allegations of material fact as true, and construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). Leave to amend should be granted if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defects of his or her complaint. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

III. DISCUSSION

"To sustain an action under section 1983, a plaintiff must show '(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right.'" Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Because Plaintiff does not identify the specific constitutional or statutory basis for her claims, the court construes the Complaint as alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.