The opinion of the court was delivered by: Susan Oki Mollway Chief United States District Judge
Before the court is pro se Plaintiff Peter Ray Tia's prisoner civil rights Complaint and in forma pauperis ("IFP") application. On July 11, 2012, Plaintiff was ordered to show cause on or before July 31, 2012, why he should be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in this action. ECF #4. Plaintiff has not responded to the court's order.
A prisoner may not bring a civil action or appeal a civil judgment in forma pauperis if: the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
"[Section] 1915(g) should be used to deny a prisoner's IFP status only when, after careful evaluation of the order dismissing an action, and other relevant information, the district court determines that the action was dismissed because it was frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim." Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). "In some instances, the district court docket records may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one of the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike." Id. at 1120.
Plaintiff is well acquainted with the federal courts, having filed more than twenty-seven federal civil actions and appeals since 2001. See http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov. (PACER Case Locator). In its Order to Show Cause, the court notified Plaintiff that the following cases qualified as "strikes" under § 1915(g):
(1) Tia v. Fujita, 1:08-cv-00575 HG (D. Haw. Jan. 27, 2009) (dismissed for failure to state a claim);
(2) Tia v. Criminal Investigation Demanded, 1:10-cv-00383 SOM (D. Haw. Aug. 5, 2010) (dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim); and
(3) Tia v. Criminal Investigation, 1:10-cv-00441 DAE (D. Haw. Jul. 30, 2010) (dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim).*fn1
Plaintiff may not bring a civil action without complete prepayment of the $350.00 filing fee unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
To meet the "imminent danger" requirement, the "threat or prison condition [must be] real and proximate," Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2002)), and the allegations must be "specific or credible." Kinnell v. Graves, 265 F.3d 1125, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001). Further, "the availability of the [imminent danger] exception turns on the conditions a prisoner faced at the time the complaint was filed, not some earlier or later time." Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007). "[T]he exception applies if the complaint makes a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced 'imminent danger of serious physical injury' at the time of filing." Id. at 1055. Claims concerning an "imminent danger of serious physical injury" cannot be triggered solely by complaints of past abuse. See Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1998); Luedtke v. Bertrand, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1077 (E.D. Wis. 1999).
Plaintiff broadly alleges that Defendants conspired with unnamed prison officials in some sort of criminal enterprise. Plaintiff also claims that Defendants are victims, and states that he tried to raise these same claims in 2010 in his previous actions. These allegations do not support a finding that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. Plaintiff may not proceed ...