NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI`I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT WAHIAWA DIVISION (CASE NO. lDTC-11-082323)
Summer M.M. Kupau, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
Brandon H. Ito. Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, City Sc County of Honolulu, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Foley and Reifurth, JJ., with Nakamura, C.J., concurring separately
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
Defendant-Appellant Jacob A. Hargitt ("Hargitt") appeals from the Notice of Entry of Judgment and/or Order and Plea/Judgment filed on April 3, 2012 in the District Court of the First Circuit, Wahiawa Division ("District Court"). 
On appeal, Hargitt contends that (1) the District Court plainly erred by not dismissing the charge of Excessive Speeding because the charge was deficient for failing to allege the requisite mens rea, (2) the District Court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of a laser gun reading because the State failed to provide sufficient foundation for its admission, and (3) without the laser gun reading there was insufficient evidence to convict him of Excessive Speeding.
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we resolve Hargitt's points of error as follows:
On December 1, 2011, Hargitt was issued a citation for Excessive Speeding, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes ("HRS") § 291C-105(a) (1) and/or (a)(2) (Supp. 2011). On April 3, 2012, Hargitt was orally arraigned on the sole count of Excessive Speeding. The oral charge did not state the requisite mens rea for a charge of Excessive Speeding. Hargitt, however, did not object to the charge.
That same day, the District Court held a bench trial. Hargitt testified therein that, as a military police officer, he had been trained to use speed-detecting devices, including a device similar to that which Officer Jeremy Franks ("Officer Franks") used to clock his speed. Hargitt further testified that he had been traveling approximately 65 to 70 miles per hour when Officer Franks clocked his speed, and given that Officer Franks was roughly 900 feet away and several other cars were proximate to Hargitt's car, it was likely that Officer Franks had clocked a different vehicle. Hargitt also objected to the admissibility of the laser gun evidence. The District Court found Hargitt guilty as charged.
"HRS § 291C-105(a) is not a strict liability offense, but instead requires that the State prove that a defendant acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly." State v. Gonzalez, 128 Hawai'i 314, 324, 288 P.3d 788, 798 (2012). A charge for violating HRS § 291C-105(a) that does not state the requisite state of mind is insufficient pursuant to State v. Nesmith, 127 Hawai'i 48, 276 P.3d 617 (2012). Gonzalez, 128 Hawai'i at 324, 288 P.3d at 798.
"[W]hen a party raises an objection to the indictment for the first time on appeal the indictment is liberally construed." State v. Tominiko, 126 Hawai'i 68, 76, 266 P.3d 1122, 1130 (2011) (citing State v. Motta, 66 Haw. 89, 90, 657 p.2d 1019, 1019 (1983)). "This standard means we will not reverse a conviction based upon a defective indictment unless the defendant can show prejudice or that the indictment cannot within reason be construed to charge a crime." Id. (quoting Motta, 66 Haw. at 91, 657 P.2d at 1020) (internal quotation marks omitted). The liberal construction approach applies to oral charges. State ...