This decision is published in table format in the Pacific and Hawai'i reporter
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT. (CITATION NO. 3DTI-13-006391).
On the briefs: Ramala L. Anthony, Defendant-Appellant, Pro se.
Ryan K. Caday, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, County of Hawai'i, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
By: Foley, Presiding Judge, and Fujise and Reifurth, JJ.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
Defendant-Appellant Kamala L. Anthony (" Anthony" ) appeals from the September 19, 2013 Notice of Entry of Judgment and/or Order (" Judgment" ) entered by the District Court of the Third Circuit, North and South Hilo Division (" District Court" ).
On June 28, 2013, Anthony was stopped and ticketed by Hawai'i Police Department Officer Jeremy Kubojiri for failing to wear a seatbelt in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (" HRS" ) § 291-11.6 (Supp. 2013). Anthony was wearing her seatbelt when Officer Kubojiri reached her driver's side window, but the parties disagree as to whether she had it on before that. Anthony maintains that she wore a seatbelt at all times.
On August 5, 2013, the District Court considered Anthony's contest to her ticket, entered judgment for the State of Hawai'i (" State" ), and ordered Anthony to pay $92 in fees and other costs. Anthony then requested a trial de novo pursuant to Hawaii Civil Traffic Rules (" HCTR" ) Rule 19(b). A bench trial was held on September 19, 2013, and the District Court again found in favor of the State.
On appeal, Anthony claims that:
The judgment in favor of the State of Hawaii clearly shows that the judge ignored my testimony and by doing this, the judge has ignored the express words for section 701-115(1) Hawaii Revised Statutes and denied me my constitutionally protected right to [due] process of law.
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we resolve Anthony's point of error as follows and affirm:
Anthony argues that the District Court erred by " ignor[ing] the express words [of HRS] section 701-115(1)," yet fails to identify exactly how that failure was demonstrated. Presumably, Anthony refers to HRS § 701-115 in order to argue that the State failed to prove each element of the seat belt infraction " beyond a reasonable doubt" at the September 19, 2013 trial. The appropriate standard of proof for this case, however, " shall be whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the court finds that the traffic infraction was committed[.]" Haw. Rev. Stat. § 291D-8(a)(3) (emphasis added). Therefore, to succeed in making its prima facie case, the State must have provided the finder of fact at trial with enough proof to find that " the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence." Luat v. ...