United States District Court, D. Hawaii
NAPOLEON T. ANNAN-YARTEY SR., Plaintiff,
OFFICER T. MURANAKA; OFFICER ROYCE S. OHIRA; OFFICER CHAD K. MURPHY; HONOLULU CHIEF OF POLICE LOUIS M. KEALOHA; HONOLULU POLICE DEPARTMENT; CITY & COUNTY OF HONOLULU; and “ALL POLICE OFFICERS INVOLVED AND OFFICIALS, ” Defendants.
ORDER: (1) GRANTING APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN
DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS; (2)
DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT IN PART; AND (3)
Michael Seabright Chief United States District Judge.
November 1, 2016, pro se Plaintiff Napoleon T. Annan-Yartey,
Sr. (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint for Civil
Right Violation against the City and County of Honolulu (the
“City”); Honolulu Police Department
(“HPD”); HPD Officers T. Muranaka
(“Muranaka”), Royce S. Ohira
(“Ohira”), and Chad K. Murphy
(“Murphy”) in their individual capacities; HPD
Chief Louis M. Kealoha (“Kealoha”) in his
official capacity; and “all police officers involved
and officials” (“Doe Defendants”)
(collectively, “Defendants”), ECF No. 1, and an
Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying
Fees or Costs (“IFP Application”), ECF No. 4. On
November 3, 2016, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, ECF
No. 5, followed by a “Second Amended Complaint”
(docketed as a “Supplement” because Plaintiff did
not yet have court leave to file an amended complaint) on
November 15, 2016, ECF No. 6. The next day, Plaintiff filed a
Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint, ECF No. 7,
which was granted on November 17, 2016, ECF No. 8. On
November 21, 2016, Plaintiff filed his “Second Amended
Complaint for Civil Right Violation”
(“SAC”), correcting an error on the cover page of
the previously filed Supplement. ECF No. 10.
forth below, the court GRANTS Plaintiff's IFP
Application, DISMISSES the SAC in part, and DIRECTS service
of the SAC.
IFP Application indicates that he has no income, assets, or
expenses. IFP Appl. ¶¶ 2-6, 8, ECF No. 4. Because
Plaintiff has made the required showing under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 to proceed in forma pauperis
(i.e., without prepayment of fees), the court GRANTS
Plaintiff's IFP Application.
asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983,
and 1985(3) for alleged discrimination and violations of
Plaintiff's rights secured by the First, Fourth, Fifth,
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
as well as state law claims.
an African-American male, alleges that Muranaka, Ohira, and
Murphy arrested him, and searched and seized his belongings
without probable cause after Plaintiff, who was carrying a
bag of recently purchased food, crossed a street along with
other pedestrians. SAC ¶¶ 8, 9, 21-23, 25-26.
Muranaka and Ohira allegedly made racially derogatory
remarks; Ohira choked Plaintiff; all three officers
“pulled him by his neck and then threw him on the
ground, ” restrained him with handcuffs, and took his
wallet; Muranaka searched Plaintiff's bag and took his
federally-issued ID; and all three officers held him on the
ground for a lengthy period of time until Muranaka stated
that Plaintiff “came up clean;” all without
telling Plaintiff why he was stopped. Id.
¶¶ 24, 26-29, 31, 33. Plaintiff was charged in
state court with disobeying traffic signals and littering
based on affidavits of probable cause containing allegedly
false statements or omissions by the three officers.
Id. ¶¶ 34, 36. Plaintiff appeared in court
several times related to the allegedly false charges before
they were dismissed with prejudice, based on a motion by the
prosecuting attorney. Id. ¶¶ 39-40.
Somewhat confusingly, the SAC later alleges that
“criminal proceedings against [Plaintiff] went to trial
and the court came with a (not guilty verdict) thereafter all
charges were dismissed in favor of Plaintiff, ”
id. ¶ 52, and that “[a]ll 65 charges were
terminated in Plaintiffs favor, ” id. ¶
Plaintiff alleges that the officers' conduct was a direct
result of the “deliberate policies and practices”
of the City, including a failure to: (1) “adequately
supervise and train its officers”; (2) “properly
and adequately monitor and discipline its officers”;
and (3) “adequately and properly investigate citizen
complaints of police misconduct.” Id.
¶¶ 44, 47. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges
that HPD has a “policy, practice and/or custom of
unlawfully interfering with and/or arresting, without
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, individuals who
exercise their rights under the First Amendment by engaging
in monitoring and documenting police activities and/or
misconduct.” Id. ¶ 48. Finally, Plaintiff
alleges that HPD Chief Louis M. Kealoha
(“Kealoha”) “exercised and delegated . . .
municipal final decision making power to the Internal Affairs
Bureau and others[, and] trained and supervised individual
Defendants Muranaka, Murphy and . . . Ohira.”
Id. ¶ 17.
alleges § 1983 claims against all Defendants for
violation of rights protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth,
and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution including due process (Counts 1 and 5);
unreasonable search, seizure, and arrest without probable
cause (Count 2); excessive force (Count 3); and malicious
prosecution (Count 4). The SAC alleges claims against
Muranaka, Chad, and Ohira for (1) violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and for racial discrimination and conspiracy to
discriminate pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983,
and 1985(3) (Count 11); and (2) intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress (Count 12). The SAC alleges
state law claims against all Defendants for violation of
rights protected by the Hawaii State Constitution including
equal protection (Count 7); unlawful search, seizure, arrest,
and excessive force (Count 8); and malicious prosecution
(Count 9). And the SAC alleges claims against the City
pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services,
436 U.S. 658 (1978) (Count 6), and the doctrine of respondeat
superior (Count 10).
result of the foregoing, the SAC alleges that Plaintiff
suffered “physical, mental and emotional injury and
pain, mental anguish, suffering, humiliation and
embarrassment.” Id. ¶ 55. See also Id
. ¶¶ 57, 58, 61, 63, 70. Plaintiff seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and
punitive damages. Id. ¶ VII.
Standards of Review
court must subject each civil action commenced pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a), governing IFP proceedings, to
mandatory screening. The court must order the dismissal of
any claim that it finds “(i) is frivolous or malicious,
(ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” Id. §
1915(e)(2)(B); see, e.g., Calhoun v. Stahl,
254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that
“the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are
not limited to prisoners”); Lopez v. Smith,
203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating that
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but
requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an IFP
complaint that fails to state a claim).
state a claim, a pleading must contain a “short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A complaint
that lacks a cognizable legal theory or alleges insufficient
facts under a cognizable legal theory fails to state a claim.
See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners
LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing
Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d
696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). A plaintiff must allege
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Weber v. Dep't of
Veterans Affairs, 521 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008).
This tenet -- that the court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in the complaint -- “is
inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, ...