United States District Court, D. Hawaii
ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WITHOUT
PREJUDICE; RESERVING RULING ON
PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN DISTRICT COURT
WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS; AND RESERVING RULING ON ALL
OTHER PENDING MOTIONS
E. Kobayashi United States District Judge
December 9, 2016, pro se Plaintiff Xavier Flores
(“Plaintiff”) filed, inter alia, his
Complaint and an Application to Proceed in District Court
Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“Application”).
[Dkt. nos. 1, 7.] The Court has considered these matters
without a hearing pursuant to Rule LR7.2(e) of the Local
Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the
District of Hawai`i (“Local Rules”). After
careful consideration of the Complaint and the relevant legal
authority, this Court HEREBY DISMISSES the Complaint WITHOUT
PREJUDICE - in other words, Plaintiff has LEAVE TO FILE an
Court will reserve ruling on the Application and all of his
other motions until Plaintiff files his amended
courts can authorize the commencement of any suit without
prepayment of fees or security by a person who submits an
affidavit that demonstrates he is unable to pay.”
Smallwood v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, CV. NO.
16-00505 DKW-KJM, 2016 WL 4974948, at *1 (D. Hawai`i Sept.
16, 2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)).
The Court subjects each civil action commenced pursuant to
Section 1915(a) to mandatory screening and can order the
dismissal of any claims it finds “frivolous, malicious,
failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v.
Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only
permits but requires” the court to sua sponte
dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to
state a claim); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845
(9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that “the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited
Id. at *3.
addition, this Court has recognized that the following
standards apply in the screening analysis:
Plaintiff is appearing pro se; consequently, the court
liberally construes her pleadings. Eldridge v.
Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The
Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to liberally
construe the ‘inartful pleading' of pro se
litigants.” (citing Boag v. MacDougall, 454
U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam))). The court also
recognizes that “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that
no amendment can cure the defect . . . a pro se litigant is
entitled to notice of the complaint's deficiencies and an
opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.”
Lucas v. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th
Cir. 1995); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,
1126 (9th. [sic] Cir. 2000).
Despite the liberal pro se pleading standard, the court may
dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) on its own motion. See Omar v.
Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987)
(“A trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte
under [Rule] 12(b)(6). Such a dismissal may be made without
notice where the claimant cannot possibly win
relief.”); Ricotta v. California, 4 F.Supp.2d
961, 968 n.7 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (“The Court can dismiss a
claim sua sponte for a Defendant who has not filed a
motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).”);
see also Baker v. Dir., U.S. Parole Comm'n, 916
F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that district court
may dismiss cases sua sponte pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) without notice where plaintiff could not prevail on
complaint as alleged). Additionally, a paid complaint that is
“obviously frivolous” does not confer federal
subject matter jurisdiction and may be dismissed sua
sponte before service of process. Franklin v.
Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227 n.6 (9th Cir. 1984); see
also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas
Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 593 (2004)
(“[I]t is the obligation of both district court and
counsel to be alert to jurisdictional requirements.”).
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,
” possessing “only that power authorized by
Constitution and statute.” United States v.
Marks, 530 F.3d 799, 810 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375,
377 (1994)). The assumption is that the district court lacks
jurisdiction. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377.
Accordingly, a “party invoking the federal court's
jurisdiction has the burden of proving the actual existence
of subject matter jurisdiction.” Thompson v.
McCombe, 99 F.3d 352, 353 (9th Cir. 1996).
Mather v. Nakasone, Civil No. 13-00436 LEK-KSC, 2013
WL 4788930, at *1-2 (D. Hawai`i Sept. 5, 2013) (alterations
in Mather) (citation omitted).
Complaint appears to be more like a letter to Defendant
Donald Trump (“Defendant”) expressing
Plaintiffs' disagreement with the positions that
Defendant took on economic issues during the presidential
campaign. Plaintiff asks the Court to compel Defendant to
meet with him to review these issues, and he argues that the
Court should impose daily sanctions against Defendant until
he meets with Plaintiff. This Court cannot determine what
claims Plaintiff is attempting to assert against Defendant.
This Court therefore CONCLUDES that Plaintiff's Complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Because this Court is unable to discern the legal basis for
the Complaint, this Court cannot provide Plaintiff with
notice of how to cure the deficiencies in the Complaint. At
the same time, this ...