United States District Court, D. Hawaii
ORDER: (1) GRANTING APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN
DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS; AND (2)
DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
Michael Seabright Chief United States District Judge
(1) GRANTING APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT
PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS; AND (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND
December 22, 2016, Plaintiff Gina Diane Inda Dela Cruz
(“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed an
“Opening Statement, ” ECF No. 1, which the court
construes as a Complaint. On January 30, 2017, Plaintiff
sought to proceed in forma pauperis by filing an Application
to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs
(“IFP Application”), ECF No. 6, and a
“Statement” that provides more detail regarding
her financial condition, ECF No. 7. Pursuant to Local Rule
7.2(d), the court finds these matters suitable for
disposition without a hearing. Based on the following, the
court GRANTS the IFP Application and DISMISSES the Complaint
with leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
IFP Application and Statement, viewed together, indicate that
Plaintiff's sole income is $866 per month in Social
Security disability payments. IFP Appl. ¶¶ 2, 3;
Statement at PageID ## 13, 14. Plaintiff has $50 in a bank
account, $200 in cash, and two cars, one of which has a
“broken throttle problem.” IFP Appl. ¶¶
4, 5. Plaintiff's expenses include $509 per month for
rent, $61 for car insurance, and an unspecified amount for a
cell phone. Id. ¶ 6; Statement at PageID # 13.
Plaintiff has no dependents or other debts. IFP Appl.
¶¶ 7, 8.
Plaintiff has made the required showing under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 to proceed in forma pauperis
(i.e., without prepayment of fees), the court GRANTS
Plaintiff's IFP Application.
Complaint reads in its entirety:
Your Honor Dr. Tamara Todd had no evidence that I did harm to
my baby Sienna Lovely Garcia in 2009. I did no harm to my
daughter and Dr. Tamara Todd violated my privacy to ask me
about a c.p.s. Case and made a false call on me to c.p.s. at
the hospital Hilo medical center. In bad faith she called
c.p.s. with no evidence of harm she violated the laws of
TITLE 42 1983 AND TITLE 42 1985. I am asking that she pay of
the harm that she caused me. I'm asking for 7 million
dollars for the hell that she caused and me not having my
daughter for years. I do have evidence that Child protective
services did me wrong.
Compl. at 1.
Standards of Review
court must subject each civil action commenced pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a), governing IFP proceedings, to
mandatory screening. The court must order the dismissal of
any claim that it finds “(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;
or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B); see, e.g., Calhoun v. Stahl,
254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that
“the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are
not limited to prisoners”); Lopez v. Smith,
203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating that
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but
requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an IFP
complaint that fails to state a claim).
state a claim, a pleading must contain a “short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This
requires “more than an unadorned,
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A
complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)); see also Weber v. Dep't of Veterans
Affairs, 521 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008).
is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556); Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d
962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). But factual allegations that only
permit the court to infer “the mere possibility of
misconduct” do not show that the plaintiff is entitled
to relief as required by Rule 8. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); Moss, 572 F.3d at
969. Thus, a district court may dismiss a complaint for
failure to comply with Rule 8 where it fails to provide the
defendant fair notice of the wrongs allegedly committed.
See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178-80 ...