JOHN PRESTON, DIRECTLY AND DERIVATIVELY, AS SHAREHOLDER OF ELECTROMAGNETICS CORPORATION, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, CONTINUUM ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, Plaintiffs-Appellees
CHRISTOPHER NAGEL, IDL DEVELOPMENT, LLC, Defendants-Appellants
from the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts in No. l:15-cv-13592-WGY, Judge William G.
M. Cacace, Todd & Weld LLP, Boston, MA, argued for
plaintiffs-appellees. Also represented by Howard M. Cooper.
Paul Martin, Goodwin Procter LLP, Boston, MA, argued for
defendants-appellants. Also repre- sented by Roberto M.
Braceras; Michael Gavin Strapp, DLA Piper U.S. LLP, Boston,
Dyk, Taranto, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
HUGHES, CIRCUIT JUDGE.
district court remanded this case to state court for a lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because 28 U.S.C. §
1447(d) bars review of the district court's decision to
remand, we dismiss this appeal.
(collectively, Preston) filed a complaint against Defendants
(collectively, Nagel) in Massachusetts Superior Court
alleging fifteen state-law claims. Nagel answered the
complaint and filed eleven counterclaims under the
Declaratory Judgment Act seeking declarations of
non-infringement of several patents held by plaintiff
Electromagnetics Corporation. Nagel also removed the case to
the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the general
removal statute, and 28 U.S.C. § 1454, the patent
removal statute. Preston moved to remand. The court
determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because
Preston's state-law claims did not arise under federal
law and Nagel's patent counterclaims did not present a
justiciable case or controversy under Article III. It
therefore remanded the case to Massachusetts Superior Court.
Nagel timely appealed.
seeks review of the district court's decision to remand
this case. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), "[a]n order
remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed
is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, " sub- ject to
statutory exceptions not applicable here. This reviewability
bar "applies equally to cases removed under the general
removal statute, § 1441, and to those removed under
other provisions." Kircher v. Putnam Funds Tr.,
547 U.S. 633, 641 (2006). Because § 1447(d) is to
"be read in pari materia with § 1447(c),
" it "preclude[s] review only of remands for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and for defects in removal
procedure." Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs.,
Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 229-30 (2007); see Quackenbush
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711-12 (1996);
Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S.
336, 345-46 (1976). As the district court found no procedural
flaws, [J.A. 131-34], we must determine if
it "relied upon a ground that is colorably characterized
as subject-matter jurisdiction." Powerex, 551
U.S. at 234. If it did, "appellate review is barred by
§ 1447(d)." Id.
the district court remanded the case because it found that it
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Preston's
state-law claims and that Nagel's patent counterclaims
did not present an Article III case or controversy because
they failed to satisfy the immediacy requirement of
Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118,
126-27 (2007). At oral argument, Preston conceded that
this was a remand based on subject-matter jurisdiction. Oral
Argument at 13:10-13:21,
16-1524.mp3. Thus, § 1447(d) facially controls,
and we are precluded "from second-guessing the district
court's jurisdiction determination regarding subject
matter, " Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, 763
F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014), "no matter how plain
the legal error in ordering the remand, " Briscoe v.
Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 413 n.l3(1977).
that § 1447(d) would ordinarily bar reviewability here,
Nagel asks us to hold that an exception exists "where,
as here, defendants invoked § 1454 to remove patent
claims over which federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction." Appellants' Br. at 17. In support,
Nagel relies on Osborn v. Haley,549 U.S. 225
(2007), to ...