United States District Court, D. Hawaii
WILLIS C. MCALLISTER, Plaintiff,
ADECCO USA INC. ET AL., Defendants.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL AND AFFIRMING
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S MAY 10, 2017 ORDER
Michael Seabright Chief United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Willis C. McAllister (“Plaintiff”)
appeals Magistrate Judge Kenneth J. Mansfield's May 10,
2017 “Order Denying Plaintiff's Revised Motion for
Leave to File Second Amended Complaint” (the “May
10 Order”), ECF No. 188. Because the May 10 Order is
neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law,
Plaintiff's Appeal is DENIED, and the May 10 Order is
August 9, 2016, Plaintiff filed a “Complaint for
Employment Discrimination, ” ECF No. 1, and a document
titled “Plaintiff's Original Complaint, ” ECF
No. 2 (collectively, the “Complaint”), alleging
race discrimination claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. On February
9, 2017, this court dismissed the § 1981 claims asserted
against Defendant Trane U.S., Inc. (“Trane”), and
granted Plaintiff leave to amend (the “February 9
Order”). ECF No. 188. The February 9 Order provided
that “[a]n amended complaint may not add any new
parties or claims.” Id. at 7.
March 10, 2017, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”) adding new defendants -- Adecco Group
A.G.; Ingersoll Rand, Inc. (“Ingersoll Rand”);
and Shawna Q. Huddy (“Huddy”). ECF No. 117. On
March 15, 2017, the court struck these new defendants and
advised Plaintiff that “[i]f [he] wishes to add new
parties and/or claims, he must first seek leave in accordance
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.” ECF No. 126
at 3. On March 22, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Revised Motion for
Leave to File Second Amended Complaint
(“SAC”). ECF No. 147. The proposed SAC sought leave
to add the three defendants previously stricken
(collectively, the “Proposed Defendants”).
Id. at 2.
10 Order denied with prejudice Plaintiff's Revised Motion
to the extent it sought to assert Title VII claims against
the Proposed Defendants. See ECF No. 188 at 7, 10.
The magistrate judge ruled that Plaintiff's Title VII
claims are futile because they are time-barred and do not
relate back to the original Complaint under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C). Id. at 4-7. The May 10
Order denied without prejudice the Revised Motion to the
extent it sought to assert § 1981 claims against the
Proposed Defendants. Id. at 9, 10.
24, 2017, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Extension of
Time to File an Appeal” of the May 10 Order, ECF No.
204, which this court construed as a timely appeal. ECF No.
205. The court then granted Plaintiff additional time to file
a supporting memorandum. Id. On June 8, 2017,
Plaintiff filed his supporting memorandum
(“Appeal”). ECF No. 215. Trane filed its
Opposition on June 16, 2017, ECF No. 218, and Defendant
Adecco USA, Inc. (“Adecco”) filed its Opposition
on June 21, 2017, ECF No. 222.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 72(a), and LR 74.1, any party may appeal to the
district court any pretrial nondispositive matter determined
by a magistrate judge. Such an order may be reversed by the
district court judge only when it is “clearly erroneous
or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); LR
74.1. An order is “contrary to law” when it
“fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case
law, or rules of procedure.” Akey v. Placer
Cty., 2017 WL 1831944, at *10 (E.D. Cal. May 8, 2017)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). And an order is
“clearly erroneous” if, after review, the court
has a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S.
234, 242 (2001); Fisher v. Tucson Unified Sch.
Dist., 652 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2011); Cochran
v. Aguirre, 2017 WL 2505230, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 9,
2017) (citing cases). “[R]eview under the
‘clearly erroneous' standard is significantly
deferential.” Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr.
Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993). Thus,
the district court “may not simply substitute its
judgment for that of the deciding court.” Grimes v.
City & Cty. of S.F., 951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th Cir.
1991); Cochran, 2017 WL 2505230, at *1.
orders of a magistrate' judge ‘under §
636(b)(1)(A) . . . are not subject to a de novo
determination.'” Hypolite v. Zamora, 2017
WL 68113, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2017) (quoting Merritt
v. Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 649 F.2d 1013, 1017
(5th Cir. 1981)). Consideration by the reviewing court of new
evidence, therefore, is not permitted. United States ex
rel. Liotine v. CDW Gov't, Inc., 2013 WL 1611427, at
*1 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2013) (“If the district court
allowed new evidence [on review of a magistrate judge's
non-dispositive order], it would essentially be conducting an
impermissible de novo review of the order.”);
cf. United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621 (9th
Cir. 2000) (determining that “a district court has
discretion, but is not required, to consider evidence
presented for the first time” in a de novo review of a
magistrate judge's dispositive recommendation).
identifies the exact issues he is appealing (and what he is
(1) “Plaintiff acknowledges and agrees . . . that
[Huddy] can not (sic) be sued for individual liability under
Title VII . . . [thus] Plaintiff is not asserting an
individual liability Title VII claim against ...