United States District Court, D. Hawaii
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DENYING
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Derrick K. Watson, United States District
the Court are Plaintiff Thad Thompson's First Amended
Complaint (“FAC”), ECF No. 7, and Motion for
Preliminary Injunction. ECF No. 2. Thompson is incarcerated at
the Halawa Correctional Facility (“HCF”) and is
proceeding in forma pauperis. He names the Hawaii Department
of Public Safety (“DPS”), HCF, and HCF official
Nolan Uehara, in his individual and official capacities, as
Defendants. Thompson alleges that Defendants violated his
constitutional right to due process under the Fourteenth
following reasons, Thompson's FAC is DISMISSED pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A(a), with leave
granted to amend. Thompson's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction is DENIED.
courts must screen all cases in which prisoners seek redress
from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, or seek to
proceed without prepayment of the civil filing fees.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a).
Courts must identify cognizable claims and dismiss those
claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim
on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b).
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual
allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). Moreover, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each
defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his
rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
prisoners' pleadings must be liberally construed and
given the benefit of any doubt. Blaisdell v.
Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013); Hebbe
v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However,
“the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a
plaintiff's factual allegations.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A]
liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not
supply essential elements of the claim that were not
initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union
Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.
1982)). A plaintiff must identify specific facts supporting
the existence of substantively plausible claims for relief.
Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014)
(per curiam) (citation omitted). Leave to amend should be
granted if it appears possible that the plaintiff can correct
the complaint's defects. Lopez v. Smith, 203
F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
sustain an action under section 1983, a plaintiff must show
‘(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a
person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the
conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or
statutory right.'” Hydrick v. Hunter, 500
F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 556 U.S. 1256 (2009);
see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as
a result of a particular defendant's conduct and an
affirmative link between the injury and the violation of his
rights. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,
371-72, 377 (1976). “A person ‘subjects'
another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within
the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act,
participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to
perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes
the deprivation of which complaint is made.”
Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
March 27 and 29, 2017, Thompson was written up for fighting
with two other inmates. On April 19, 2017, Thompson signed
two Notice of Report of Misconduct and Hearing forms, giving
him twenty-four hours notice of the hearing to be held the
next day regarding the charges. See ECF No. 7-1.
Thompson asked Monica Chun, who delivered the notices, to
postpone the hearings so that he could find witnesses. He
also asked if she would speak with Captain Paleka, because
Thompson believed that Paleka and other prison officials were
aware that he was not the aggressor. Chun agreed.
hearing for both incidents was held on May 2, 2017.
Discipline committee chair Defendant Nolan Uehara inquired
whether Thompson was planning to participate. Thompson said
he was, but asked if Uehara would speak with Chun regarding
Captain Paleka's opinion of the incidents, and he
requested Uehara to call his witnesses. Uehara allegedly said
he was not interested in Captain Paleka's opinion and
would not call Thompson's witnesses. Apparently, Thompson
then refused to participate. See ECF No. 7-1, PageID
#32, 34 (“Findings and Disposition of Corrective
Action”). The discipline committee found Thompson
guilty of both charges and sanctioned him to thirty days in
lockdown for each charge, to run consecutively. Thompson
refused to sign the hearing decisions. See id.
4, 2017, Thompson filed two grievances (Nos. 394917 and
390924) regarding Uehara's comments and behavior at the
hearing. They were rejected because Thompson did not include
copies of his disciplinary findings. Thompson immediately
filed two more grievances (Nos. 390936 and 390937). Thompson
states that he has not completed the HCF grievance process
regarding his claims because he “is seeking a
preliminary injunction regarding this complaint's issues
[and] has not yet been able to exhaust.” FAC, ECF No.
7, PageID #26. Thompson seeks damages and that his charges be
Claims Against HCF ...