United States District Court, D. Hawaii
THAD J. THOMPSON, #A5013250, Plaintiff,
HAWAII DEP'T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, HALAWA CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, SGT. IKEGAMI, COUNSELOR TORRES, CPT. PALEKA, Defendants,
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DENYING
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
E. Kobayashi United States District Judge.
the Court are Plaintiff Thad J. Thompson's First Amended
Complaint (“FAC”), ECF No. 12, and two Motions
for Preliminary Injunction. ECF Nos. 2, 9. Thompson is
incarcerated at the Halawa Correctional Facility
(“HCF”) and is proceeding in forma pauperis. He
names the Hawaii Department of Public Safety
(“DPS”), HCF, HCF Sergeant Ikegami, Counselor
Torres, and Captain Paleka as Defendants in their individual
and official capacities. Thompson alleges that Defendants
violated his constitutional right to access the court.
following reasons, Thompson's FAC is DISMISSED with leave
granted to amend and his Motions for Preliminary Injunction
courts must screen all cases in which prisoners seek redress
from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, or seek to
proceed without prepayment of the civil filing fees.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(2) and 1915A(a).
The court must identify cognizable claims and dismiss those
claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim
on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at
§§ 1915(b)(2) and 1915A(b).
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual
allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). Moreover, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each
defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his
rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
prisoners' pleadings must be liberally construed and
given the benefit of any doubt. Blaisdell v.
Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013); Hebbe
v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However,
“the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a
plaintiff's factual allegations.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A]
liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not
supply essential elements of the claim that were not
initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union
Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.
1982)). A plaintiff must identify specific facts supporting
the existence of substantively plausible claims for relief.
Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014)
(per curiam) (citation omitted). Leave to amend should be
granted if it appears possible that the plaintiff can correct
the complaint's defects. Lopez v. Smith, 203
F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
sustain an action under section 1983, a plaintiff must show
‘(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a
person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the
conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or
statutory right.'” Hydrick v. Hunter, 500
F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 556 U.S. 1256 (2009);
see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as
a result of a particular defendant's conduct and an
affirmative link between the injury and the violation of his
rights. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,
371-72, 377 (1976). “A person ‘subjects'
another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within
the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act,
participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to
perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes
the deprivation of which complaint is made.”
Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
alleges that Defendants violated his First Amendment right of
access to the courts by limiting the amount of legal
paperwork he is allowed to keep in his cell to three inches,
denying him a “reasonable amount” of writing
paper, and any manilla envelopes. FAC, ECF No. 12, PageID
#51. He suggests that these restrictions have or will impede
his litigation in Thompson v. Afamasaga, Civ. No.
1:16-cv-00128 JMS-KSC (D. Haw. 2016), although he points to
no specific instance where his efforts to prosecute Civ. No.
1:16-cv-00128 has been hindered or obstructed.
Claims Against HCF and DPS Are Dismissed
“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in
federal court against a state, its agencies, and state
officials acting in their official capacities.”
Aholelei v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144,
1147 (9th Cir. 2007). Defendants named in their official
capacities are subject to suit under § 1983 only
“for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief . .
. to enjoin an alleged ongoing violation of federal
law.” Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 2013 WL 1767710,
at *7 (D. Haw. Apr. 23, 2013) (quoting Wilbur v.
Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2005),
abrogated on other grounds by Levin v. Commerce Energy
Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010)); see also Will v. Mich.
Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989).
“state agencies . . . are not ‘persons'
within the meaning of § 1983, and are therefore not
amenable to suit under that statute.” Maldonado v.
Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing
Will, 491 U.S. at 70). Nor are jail or prison
facilities “persons” amenable to suit under
§ 1983. See Allison v. California Adult
Auth., 419 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1969).
HCF nor DPS are “persons” under § 1983 and
they are DISMISSED. See Christman v. Micheletti, 302
F. App'x 742, 743 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal of
claims against ...