Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Thompson v. Hawaii Dep't of Public Safety

United States District Court, D. Hawaii

July 3, 2017

THAD J. THOMPSON, #A5013250, Plaintiff,
v.
HAWAII DEP'T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, HALAWA CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, SGT. IKEGAMI, COUNSELOR TORRES, CPT. PALEKA, Defendants,

          ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DENYING MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

          Leslie E. Kobayashi United States District Judge.

         Before the Court are Plaintiff Thad J. Thompson's First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ECF No. 12, and two Motions for Preliminary Injunction.[1] ECF Nos. 2, 9. Thompson is incarcerated at the Halawa Correctional Facility (“HCF”) and is proceeding in forma pauperis. He names the Hawaii Department of Public Safety (“DPS”), HCF, HCF Sergeant Ikegami, Counselor Torres, and Captain Paleka as Defendants in their individual and official capacities. Thompson alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional right to access the court.

         For the following reasons, Thompson's FAC is DISMISSED with leave granted to amend and his Motions for Preliminary Injunction are DENIED.

         I. SCREENING

         Federal courts must screen all cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, or seek to proceed without prepayment of the civil filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(2) and 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims and dismiss those claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at §§ 1915(b)(2) and 1915A(b).

         A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

         Pro se prisoners' pleadings must be liberally construed and given the benefit of any doubt. Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). A plaintiff must identify specific facts supporting the existence of substantively plausible claims for relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the plaintiff can correct the complaint's defects. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

         II. DISCUSSION

         “To sustain an action under section 1983, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right.'” Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 556 U.S. 1256 (2009); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

         Additionally, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of a particular defendant's conduct and an affirmative link between the injury and the violation of his rights. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). “A person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

         A. Thompson's Claims

         Thompson alleges that Defendants violated his First Amendment right of access to the courts by limiting the amount of legal paperwork he is allowed to keep in his cell to three inches, denying him a “reasonable amount” of writing paper, and any manilla envelopes. FAC, ECF No. 12, PageID #51. He suggests that these restrictions have or will impede his litigation in Thompson v. Afamasaga, Civ. No. 1:16-cv-00128 JMS-KSC (D. Haw. 2016), although he points to no specific instance where his efforts to prosecute Civ. No. 1:16-cv-00128 has been hindered or obstructed.

         B. Claims Against HCF and DPS Are Dismissed

          “The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state, its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). Defendants named in their official capacities are subject to suit under § 1983 only “for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief . . . to enjoin an alleged ongoing violation of federal law.” Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 2013 WL 1767710, at *7 (D. Haw. Apr. 23, 2013) (quoting Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Levin v. Commerce Energy Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010)); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989).

         Moreover, “state agencies . . . are not ‘persons' within the meaning of § 1983, and are therefore not amenable to suit under that statute.” Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 70). Nor are jail or prison facilities “persons” amenable to suit under § 1983. See Allison v. California Adult Auth., 419 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1969).

         Neither HCF nor DPS are “persons” under § 1983 and they are DISMISSED. See Christman v. Micheletti, 302 F. App'x 742, 743 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal of claims against ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.