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Williams v. Ige

United States District Court, D. Hawaii

July 14, 2017

MAUNU RENAH WILLIAMS, #A6070389, Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID Y. IGE, et al., Defendants,

          ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT IN PART

          SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         Before the court is Plaintiff Maunu Renah Williams's Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) and its exhibits, ECF No. 23, and Supplement to the SAC, ECF No. 24. Williams names Hawaii Governor David Y. Ige, President Donald J. Trump, and Halawa Correctional Facility (“HCF”) Residency Section Administrator Doveline Borges as Defendants. He again alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by denying him a pardon, clemency, or transfer to the Hawaii State Hospital.

         Williams also alleges that an Adult Correctional Officer (“ACO”) at HCF, ACO Clark, allowed or encouraged another inmate to assault him in or about November 29, 2016. Williams's SAC is DISMISSED IN PART with leave granted to amend.

         I. BACKGROUND

         Williams claims that he is a fugitive from justice from Oregon, Washington, Texas, California, and New York because of his mental health. He again challenges Governor Ige's and President Trump's alleged denial of his requests for clemency, and Defendant Borges's denial of his request to transfer to the Hawaii State Hospital.

         Williams also states that ACO Clark incited another inmate to assault him on November 29, 2016, apparently to have Williams removed from his workline position in the HCF kitchen, because Williams is mentally ill and “non local.” See SAC, ECF No. 23, PageID #145, #147, #148; see also Ex. C, ECF No. 23 3.

         II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING

         Federal courts must screen all cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, or seek to proceed without prepayment of the civil filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(2) and 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at §§ 1915(b)(2) and 1915A(b).

         A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

         Pro se prisoners' pleadings must be liberally construed and given the benefit of any doubt. Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). A plaintiff must identify specific facts supporting the existence of substantively plausible claims for relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the plaintiff can correct the complaint's defects. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

         III. DISCUSSION

         “To sustain an action under section 1983, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right.'” Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 556 U.S. 1256 (2009); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

         A. Claims Against Governor Ige and President Trump are Dismissed With Prejudice

         As the court carefully explained to Williams in its June 19, 2017 Order Dismissing First Amended Complaint, he has no constitutional right to a pardon, clemency, or commutation of his sentence. See Connecticut Bd. ofPardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464, 467 (1981) (holding that the power vested in the Connecticut Board of Pardons to commute sentences conferred no rights beyond the right to seek commutation); Worat ...


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