United States District Court, D. Hawaii
ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT IN
OKI MOLLWAY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the court is Plaintiff Maunu Renah Williams's Second
Amended Complaint (“SAC”) and its exhibits, ECF
No. 23, and Supplement to the SAC, ECF No. 24. Williams names
Hawaii Governor David Y. Ige, President Donald J. Trump, and
Halawa Correctional Facility (“HCF”) Residency
Section Administrator Doveline Borges as Defendants. He again
alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by
denying him a pardon, clemency, or transfer to the Hawaii
also alleges that an Adult Correctional Officer
(“ACO”) at HCF, ACO Clark, allowed or encouraged
another inmate to assault him in or about November 29, 2016.
Williams's SAC is DISMISSED IN PART with leave granted to
claims that he is a fugitive from justice from Oregon,
Washington, Texas, California, and New York because of his
mental health. He again challenges Governor Ige's and
President Trump's alleged denial of his requests for
clemency, and Defendant Borges's denial of his request to
transfer to the Hawaii State Hospital.
also states that ACO Clark incited another inmate to assault
him on November 29, 2016, apparently to have Williams removed
from his workline position in the HCF kitchen, because
Williams is mentally ill and “non local.”
See SAC, ECF No. 23, PageID #145, #147, #148;
see also Ex. C, ECF No. 23 3.
SUA SPONTE SCREENING
courts must screen all cases in which prisoners seek redress
from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, or seek to
proceed without prepayment of the civil filing fees.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(2) and 1915A(a).
The court must identify cognizable claims and dismiss claims
that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at
§§ 1915(b)(2) and 1915A(b).
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual
allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). Moreover, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each
defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his
rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
prisoners' pleadings must be liberally construed and
given the benefit of any doubt. Blaisdell v.
Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013); Hebbe
v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However,
“the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a
plaintiff's factual allegations.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A]
liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not
supply essential elements of the claim that were not
initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union
Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.
1982)). A plaintiff must identify specific facts supporting
the existence of substantively plausible claims for relief.
Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014)
(per curiam) (citation omitted). Leave to amend should be
granted if it appears possible that the plaintiff can correct
the complaint's defects. Lopez v. Smith, 203
F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
sustain an action under section 1983, a plaintiff must show
‘(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a
person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the
conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or
statutory right.'” Hydrick v.
Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 556
U.S. 1256 (2009); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Claims Against Governor Ige and President Trump are Dismissed
court carefully explained to Williams in its June 19, 2017
Order Dismissing First Amended Complaint, he has no
constitutional right to a pardon, clemency, or commutation of
his sentence. See Connecticut Bd. ofPardons v.
Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464, 467 (1981) (holding that
the power vested in the Connecticut Board of Pardons to
commute sentences conferred no rights beyond the right to
seek commutation); Worat ...