BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP FKA COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS SERVICING LP, Plaintiff-Appellee,
GRISEL REYES-TOLEDO, Defendant-Appellant, and WAI KALOI AT MAKAKILO COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, MAKAKILO COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, and PALEHUA COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, Defendants-Appellees and JOHN DOES 1-50, JANE DOES 1-50, DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-50, DOE CORPORATIONS 1-50, DOE ENTITIES 1-50, and DOE GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1-50, Defendants
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT (CIVIL NO.
Steven Geshell, for Defendant-Appellant.
B. Rosen, Zachary K. Kondo, David E. McAllister, Lloyd T.
Workman, Justin S. Mover, (Aldridge Pite LLP), for
Nakamura, Chief Judge, Leonard and Ginoza, JJ.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
Defendant-Appellant Grisel Reyes-Toledo (Reyes-Toledo)
appeals from the December 9, 2014 Judgment (Judgment) entered
in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Bank of America, N.A.,
Successor by Merger to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, fka
Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP (BOA), by the Circuit
Court of the First Circuit (Circuit Court)- The Hawai'i
Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the Judgment,
but concluded that it did not have appellate jurisdiction
over (1) the Circuit Court's February 12, 2013 order
granting BOA's motion to dismiss Reyes-Toledo's
counterclaims (Dismissal Order), or (2) the Circuit
Court's December 31, 2013 order denying reconsideration
of the Dismissal Order (Order Denying Reconsideration).
Bank of America, N.A. v. Reves-Toledo, No.
CAAP-15-0000005, 2016 WL 1092305 (Haw. App. Mar. 16, 2016)
(SDO). On grant of certiorari, the Hawai'i
Supreme Court vacated the ICA's Judgment on Appeal and,
inter alia., remanded the case to the ICA for a
determination of whether the Circuit Court erred in
dismissing Reyes-Toledo's counterclaims. Bank of
America, N.A. v. Reves-Toledo, 139 Hawai'i 361, 390
P.3d 1248 (2017).
in her remaining points of error (E & F), contends that
the Circuit Court reversibly erred (1) when it entered the
Dismissal Order, which dismissed her counterclaims for
wrongful foreclosure, declaratory judgment, quiet title, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices (UDAP), pursuant to
Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 12(b)(6),
and (2) when it entered the Order Denying Reconsideration.
careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by the
parties, and having given due consideration to the arguments
advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we resolve
Reyes-Toledo1s remaining points of error as follows:
to HRCP Rule 8(a), a "pleading which sets forth a claim
for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the
relief the pleader seeks." Moreover, the pleading
"must contain either direct allegations on every
material point necessary to sustain a recovery on any legal
theory, even though it may not be the theory suggested or
intended by the pleader, or contain allegations from which an
inference fairly may be drawn that evidence on these material
points will be introduced at trial." Marsland v.
Pang, 5 Haw.App. 463, 475, 701 P.2d 175, 186 (1985)
pleading may be dismissed under HRCP Rule
12(b)(6)for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. However, it is well recognized that:
[a] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim that
would entitle him or her to relief. We must therefore view a
plaintiff's complaint in a light most favorable to him or
her in order to determine whether the allegations contained
therein could warrant relief under any alternative theory.
For this reason, in reviewing a circuit court's order
dismissing a complaint our consideration is strictly limited
to the allegations of the complaint, and we must deem those
allegations to be true.
In re Estate of Rogers, 103 Hawai'i 275, 280-81,
81 P.3d 1190, 1195-96 (2003) (citations, brackets, and
ellipsis omitted). Furthermore,
[w]hile a complaint attacked by [an HRCP] Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations,
a plaintiff's obligation to provide the
"grounds" of his "entitlement to relief"
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the
complaint's allegations are true (even if doubtful in
Pavsek v. Sandvold, 127 Hawai'i 390, 403, 279
P.3d 55, 68 (App. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Counterclaim, Reyes-Toledo alleges that BOA's conduct in
commencing the foreclosure was willful, malicious, and
without just cause. Reyes-Toledo did not otherwise identify
any specific acts committed by BOA that would make the
supreme court recently recognized certain potential claims
for wrongful foreclosure in Hungate v. Law Office of
David B. Rosen, 139 Hawai'i 394, 407, 391 P.3d 1, 14
(2017). In Hungate, the supreme court articulated that
"creating a cause of action [against a foreclosing
mortgagee's attorney] under former HRS §
667-5 is not necessary to protect the interests
of the mortgagor" as "the mortgagor can protect its
interest through filing a claim against the mortgagee for
wrongful foreclosure." Hungate, 139 Hawai'i at 407,
391 P.3d at 14; see also Santiago v. Tanaka, 137
Hawai'i 137, 158-59, 366 P.3d 612, 633-34 (2016)
(recognizing that the ...