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Kapu v. Attorney General

United States District Court, D. Hawaii

August 2, 2017



          Derrick K. Watson United States District Judge.


         On July 7, 2017, Plaintiff King Kamehameha VII, Ni'i Loa Mo'i Kapu ("Mo'i Kapu"), formerly known as John Freeman Eleu Santos, proceeding pro se, filed a First Amended Complaint that once again attempts to assert claims against the State of Hawaii, the State Attorney General, Sheriff's Division, and the Bureau of Conveyances, challenging-as best the Court can discern-prior court rulings as well as the sovereignty of the United States and the State of Hawaii. Dkt. No. 7. The First Amended Complaint suffers from the same deficiencies as Mo'i Kapu's original Complaint, previously identified in the Court's May 15, 2017 Order granting his in forma pauperis ("IFP") Application and dismissing the Complaint with leave to amend. Dkt. No. 4 (5/15/17 Order). Because Mo'i Kapu once more fails to state a claim for relief or establish any basis for this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, the Court DISMISSES the First Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and for a second time GRANTS Mo'i Kapu leave to file an amended complaint as detailed below. The Court cautions him that failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with the terms of this order by September 1, 2017 may result in the automatic dismissal of this action.


         Because Mo'i Kapu is appearing pro se, the Court liberally construes his filings. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the 'inartful pleading' of pro se litigants.") (citing Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam)). The Court recognizes that "[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect... a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint's deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action." Lucas v. Dep 't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2013).

         I. The First Amended Complaint Is Dismissed With Leave to Amend

         Upon review of the First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), the Court finds that like the original Complaint, it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. As discussed below, even liberally construed, the FAC fails to state any discernible basis for judicial relief.

         A. Standard of Review

         he Court subjects each civil action commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening and can order the dismissal of any claims it finds "frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) "not only permits but requires" the court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that "the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners"). Because Mo'i Kapu is appearing pro se, the Court liberally construes the Complaint.

         The Court may dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]" A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper when there is either a "'lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged.'" UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep 't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). A plaintiff must allege "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Weber v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 521 F .3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). This tenet - that the court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint - "is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[Allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.").

         "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Factual allegations that only permit the Court to infer "the mere possibility of misconduct" do not show that the pleader is entitled to relief as required by Rule 8. Id. at 679.

         B. The First Amended Complaint Fails To State A Claim For Relief

         As was the case with his original Complaint, it appears that Mo'i Kapu is aggrieved by the district and appellate courts' prior rulings in Algal Partners, L.P. vs. Jon Freeman Eleu Santos, et al, Civil No. 13-00562 LEK-BMK (D. Haw), the failure of the United States and/or State of Hawaii to pay taxes to the Hawaiian Kingdom, and other unspecified conduct by numerous entities and individuals. Even given a liberal construction, the allegations in the FAC once more fail to state any sort of cognizable claim against any defendant. Mo'i Kapu alleges, in part-

The Hawaiian Kingdom has had it fully functioning government of its sovereign's rights! Corporate State of Hawai'i has no jurisdiction onto lands claim back by his Majesty for Royal Patents for none payment of Taxes. Lands revert to his Majesty. Until illegally occupied and continue to be occupied by U.S. Military, corporate State of Hawai'i and its corporative entities has not paid their fair share of Royalty taxes. The Hawaiian Kingdom under King Kamehameha I, by conquest, then King Kamehameha III, created its own independent sovereign State recognized by the three great nations England, France, and United States of America and later 89 other nations from the world countries with treaty that are still in effect today. Unlike the Cherokee Nation the Hawaiian Kingdom has had it fully functioning government of its sovereignty rights, until corporate business men illegally took control by force with the help of the U.S. Military Navy Command against Queen Liliuokalani on January 17, 1893 on the island of Oahu, committing treason against the Queen by foreign residents residing as United State citizens and subject of the kingdom. Today . . . along with other corporate State of Hawaii employees "List of Name" Exhibits-E Letter to Eric Holder justice department under jurisdiction of this U.S. District Courts of Hawai'i as a corporate State have been committed felons for receiving moneys from the opposing State as a Sovereign Hawaiian Nation and its lands. Accord[ing] to an Article III Court established under and by Article III of the U.S. Constitution in compliance with Article 43, 1907 Hague Convention IV (36 U.S. Stat. 2277). Article III ...

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