United States District Court, D. Hawaii
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT IN PART AND DIRECTING
Derrick K. Watson United States District Judge
the court is pro se Plaintiff Fred Cabrera's amended
prisoner civil rights Complaint. Am. Compl., ECF No. 7.
Cabrera complains that Defendants the State of Hawaii and
Oahu Community Correctional Center (“OCCC”)
officers Sergeant Malia Anderson and Manny Tavares violated
his rights under the Eighth Amendment during an incident that
allegedly occurred at OCCC on or about June 22, 2017.
following reasons, the State of Hawaii and the claims against
Anderson and Tavares in their official capacities are
DISMISSED. Cabrera is DIRECTED to effect service on
Defendants Malia Anderson and Manny Tavares by mailing a copy
of the amended Complaint and completed service documents to
the United States Marshal. After service is completed,
Anderson and Tavares (in their individual capacities) are
directed to respond to the amended Complaint.
courts must screen all cases in which prisoners seek redress
from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, or seek to
proceed without prepayment of the civil filing fees.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(2) and 1915A(a).
The court must identify cognizable claims and dismiss those
claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim
on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at
§§ 1915(b)(2) and 1915A(b).
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual
allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). Moreover, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each
defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his
rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
prisoners' pleadings must be liberally construed and
given the benefit of any doubt. Blaisdell v.
Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013); Hebbe
v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). Leave to
amend should be granted if it appears possible that the
plaintiff can correct the complaint's defects. Lopez
v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
Cabrera alleges that Anderson and Tavares ordered him to help
move an allegedly mentally ill inmate from one cell to
another on June 22, 2017. He claims that this inmate struck
him several times during this cell movement causing him pain,
while Tavares and Anderson stood nearby but failed to
intervene. Cabrera alleges that Defendants violated the
Eighth Amendment when they failed to protect him from this
alleged assault. He seeks $100, 000 in damages.
Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal
court against a state, its agencies, and state officials
acting in their official capacities.” Aholelei v.
Dep't of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir.
2007). Defendants named in their official capacities are
subject to suit under § 1983 only “for prospective
declaratory and injunctive relief . . . to enjoin an alleged
ongoing violation of federal law.” Oyama v. Univ.
of Haw., 2013 WL 1767710, at *7 (D. Haw. Apr. 23, 2013)
(quoting Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th
Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Levin v.
Commerce Energy Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010)); see also
Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
70-71 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his
or her official capacity is not a suit against the official
but rather is a suit against the official's
office.”); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
damages claims against the State of Hawaii, and against
Anderson and Tavares in their official capacities, are
Eighth Amendment - Failure to Protect
officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from
violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (citations and
quotations omitted). “Being violently assaulted in
prison is simply not ‘part of the penalty that criminal
offenders pay for their offenses against society.'”
Id. at 834 (citation omitted). To establish a prison
official's violation of this duty, a prisoner must first
establish that the deprivation alleged is ‘objectively,
sufficiently serious.” Id. at 834; Hearns
v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). This is
a question of fact that ...