United States District Court, D. Hawaii
Derrick K. Watson United States District Judge
the Court is pro se Plaintiff Michael Bernard Glenn's
prisoner civil rights complaint. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff is a
Hawaii state prisoner who is incarcerated at the Saguaro
Correctional Center (“SCC”) located in Eloy,
Arizona. Plaintiff names SCC Head Warden Thomas as the only
Defendant to this suit, alleges that Thomas resides in
Arizona, and complains of acts that occurred or are occurring
in Arizona at SCC. For the following reasons, this action is
TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the
District of Arizona.
court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer, or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The court must dismiss a complaint or a portion thereof if
the prisoner has raised claims that are legally
“frivolous or malicious, ” that fail to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1-2).
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual
allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). Moreover, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each
defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his
or her rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934
(9th Cir. 2002).
proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to
have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any
doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman,
680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To
survive screening, plaintiff's claims must be facially
plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow
the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962,
969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and
“facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a
defendant's liability” fall short of satisfying the
plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
first claims that Warden Thomas and/or his staff read mail
that he sent to the federal government that referenced the
National Anthem. See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID #5
(Count I). Plaintiff claims he knows this occurred because
the day after he gave his letter to prison officials for
mailing, a guard entered his housing unit singing the
National Anthem “at the top of his lungs.”
next claims that SCC officers have harassed, verbally
threatened, intimidated, and disciplined him because he wrote
to the federal government and unidentified agencies about
incidents at SCC. Id., PageID #6 (Count II).
Plaintiff claims that SCC officials have denied his requests
for medical care. Id., PageID #7 (Count III).
asks the Court to investigate his allegations and seeks
assistance in pursuing a civil rights action regarding his
may be raised sua sponte when the defendant has not filed a
responsive pleading and the time for doing so has not run.
See Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir.
1986). If jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity,
venue is proper in (1) the district in which any defendant
resides, if all of the defendants reside in the same state;
(2) the district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial
part of the property that is the subject of the action is
situated; or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant
may be found, if there is no district in which the action may
otherwise be brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
states that Warden Thomas resides in Arizona, and he
challenges acts or omissions that allegedly occurred at SCC,
which lies within the venue of the District of Arizona,
see 28 U.S.C. § 82. Thus, the first two factors
of § 1391(b) make clear that venue for this suit does
not lie in the District of Hawaii. See, e.g., Ah
Sing v. Dep't of Public Safety, 2012 WL 5880918, at
*3-4 (D. Haw. Nov. 21, 2012) (transferring suit to District
of Arizona after concluding that contractual agreement
between private prison and the State of Hawaii did not govern
venue issue, plaintiff was incarcerated at SCC, defendants
resided in Arizona, and claims allegedly occurred at SCC);
Davis v. State of Hawaii, 2009 WL 1227841, at *4 (D.
Haw. May 4, 2009) (finding venue was proper in Arizona, where
Hawaii state prisoner was incarcerated at SCC, and where he
was allegedly prevented from practicing his Native Hawaiian
religion); Lee v. Corr. Corp. of America, 525
F.Supp.2d 1238, 1242 (D. Haw. 2007) (rejecting argument that
venue lay in Hawaii based on contract between CCA and the