United States District Court, D. Hawaii
KEONI R. JAENTSCH, #A1019833, Plaintiff,
PATTIE-ANN K. PUHA, RAQUEL TAGUCHI, YUMI SUZUKI, Defendants,
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT IN PART WITH LEAVE GRANTED
GILLMOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff Keoni R. Jaentsch is incarcerated at the Oahu
Community Correctional Center (“OCCC”); he brings
this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Compl., ECF.
No. 1. Jaentsch alleges Defendants Pattie-Ann K. Puha, Raquel
Taguchi, and Yumi Suzuki (“Defendants”) violated
his constitutional rights and state criminal statutes when
they allegedly entered his home without his consent while he
was detained at OCCC.
following reasons, Jaentsch's Complaint is DISMISSED in
part with leave granted to amend.
Jaentsch is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis the Court
is required to screen his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss
a complaint or claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to
state a claim for relief, or seeks damages from defendants
who are immune from suit. See Lopez v. Smith, 203
F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (screening under
§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d
1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (screening under § 1915A(b)).
under §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) involves the same
standard of review as that used under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d
1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (screening under §
1915(e)(2)); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d
1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (screening pursuant to §
1915A). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The
“mere possibility of misconduct” or an
“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me
accusation” falls short of meeting this plausibility
standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret
Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
litigants' pleadings must be liberally construed and all
doubts should be resolved in their favor. Hebbe v.
Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations
omitted). Leave to amend must be granted if it appears the
plaintiff can correct the defects in the complaint.
Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. If the complaint cannot be
saved by amendment, dismissal without leave to amend is
appropriate. Sylvia Landfield Trust v. City of L.A.,
729 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013).
ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT
Count I, Jaentsch states that Puha, who is named in her
individual capacity, entered Jaentsch's home between
April 16 and 20, 2017, and “stole items without my
permission or concent [sic]” while he was detained at
OCCC. Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID #5. Jaentsch alleges this
constitutes an illegal search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment and violated Hawaii Revised Statutes §§
708-810, 708-812, 708-813, and 708-814.Jaentsch filed a
police report and homeowners insurance claim regarding this
Counts II and III, Jaentsch alleges that Taguchi, a
Department of Human Services (“DHS”), Child
Welfare Services division social worker, entered his home
without his consent on April 19, 2017, while he was
incarcerated at OCCC, with her supervisor, Suzuki's
authorization. Jaentsch says that he has video surveillance
of Taguchi's entry into and exit from his home. He
alleges Taguchi's and Suzuki's actions constitute an
illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment,
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and violate Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 708-811
& 708-814. Jaentsch names Taguchi and Suzuki in their
individual and official capacities.
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged
violation was committed by a person acting under the color of
state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as
a result of a particular defendant's conduct and an
affirmative link between the injury and the violation of his
rights. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,
371-72, 377 (1976).
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
names Taguchi and Suzuki in their official capacities.
“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in
federal court against a state, its agencies, and state
officials acting in their official capacities.”
Aholelei v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144,
1147 (9th Cir. 2007). Defendants named in their official
capacities are subject to suit under § 1983 only
“for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief . .
. to enjoin an alleged ongoing violation of federal
law.” Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 2013 WL 1767710,
at *7 (D. Haw. Apr. 23, 2013) (quoting Wilbur v.
Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2005),
abrogated on other grounds by Levin v. Commerce Energy,
Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010)); see also Will v. Mich.
Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989).
does not allege an ongoing constitutional violation or raise
any colorable claim for prospective declaratory or injunctive
relief. Claims against Taguchi and Suzuki as named in ...