United States District Court, D. Hawaii
JENNIFER M.K. MEDEIROS, Plaintiff,
AKAHI SERVICES, INC., Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS  PLAINTIFF'S FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED ON NOVEMBER 17, 2017
E. KOBAYASHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
December 1, 2017, Defendant Akahi Services Inc.
(“Defendant”) filed its Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint Filed on November 17,
2017 (“Motion”). [Dkt. no. 28.] Plaintiff
Jennifer M. K. Medeiros (“Plaintiff”) filed her
memorandum in opposition on February 5, 2018, and Defendant
filed its reply on February 12, 2018. [Dkt. nos. 37, 38.]
This matter came on for hearing on February 26, 2018. The
Motion is hereby granted as to Count III, which is dismissed
with prejudice, and as to that portion of Count IV which is
based on employment discrimination, which is dismissed with
prejudice. The Motion is hereby granted without prejudice as
to that portion of Count IV based on continued sexual
harassment. Plaintiff may file a motion for leave to file a
second amended complaint as to this portion of Count IV only.
Ninth Circuit has described the standard applicable to a
motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) as follows:
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
after the Supreme Court's decisions in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868
(2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), the
[plaintiff's] factual allegations “must . . .
suggest that the claim has at least a plausible chance of
success.” In re Century Aluminum [Co. Sec.
Litig.], 729 F.3d [1104, ] 1107 [(9th Cir. 2013)]. In
other words, their complaint “must allege
‘factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.'” Id. (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937).
Following Iqbal and Twombly, . . . . we
have settled on a two-step process for evaluating pleadings:
First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth,
allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply
recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain
sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair
notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself
effectively. Second, the factual allegations that are taken
as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such
that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be
subjected to the expense of discovery and continued
[Eclectic Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap
Co., 751 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2014)] (quoting
Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)).
In all cases, evaluating a complaint's plausibility is a
“context-specific” endeavor that requires courts
to “draw on . . . judicial experience and common
sense.” Id. at 995-96 (internal quotation
Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1134-35 (9th
Cir. 2014) (some alterations in Levitt).
district court has stated, “although allegations
‘upon information and belief' may state a claim
after Iqbal and Twombly, a claim must still
be based on factual content that makes liability plausible,
and not be ‘formulaic recitations of the elements of a
cause of action.'” Klohs v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 901 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1260 n.2 (D. Hawai`i 2012)
(quoting Long v. Yomes, 2011 WL 4412847, at *4 (D.
Haw. Sept. 20, 2011) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555, 127 S.Ct. 1955) (editorial mark omitted)).
who was then pro se, filed her Employment Discrimination
Complaint on June 28, 2017. [Dkt. no. 1.] Subsequently, on
October 30, 2017, she was appointed pro bono representation
and filed her First Amended Complaint on November 17, 2017
(“First Amended Complaint”). [Dkt. nos. 18, 22.]
claims in this matter arise out of her employment with
Defendant, which commenced in 1999, and where she was
promoted, first to executive vice president, and in 2013, to
company president. [Id. at ¶¶ 9-11, 18.]
She alleges that her immediate supervisor was Defendant's
chief executive officer, William Orihuela
(“Orihuela”) and that, during her employment with
Defendant, Orihuela repeatedly made inappropriate sexual
remarks, grabbed her once, and subjected her to sexual
harassment and pregnancy discrimination. [Id. at
¶¶ 12-15, 22.] On July 21, 2015, and following her
third maternity leave, she was fired. [Id. at
¶¶ 27, 35, 36.]
claims are alleged: pregnancy discrimination in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
VII”), 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq. (“Count
I”); retaliation in violation of Title VII
(“Count II”); sexual harassment and hostile work
environment in violation of Title VII (“Count
III”); and intentional infliction of emotional distress