United States District Court, D. Hawaii
EVAN AULD-SUSOTT, as Trustee for (1) IRREVOCABLE LIEF INSURANCE TRUST OF JOHN L. SUSOTT AND KATHRYN C. SUSOTT UAD 8/17/1988 AS RESTATED, EXEMPT TRUST FBO DANIEL C. SUSOTT, and (2) IRREVOCABLE LIFE INSURANCE TRUST OF JOHN L. SUSOTT AND KATHRYN C. SUSOTT UAD 8/17/1988 AS RESTATED, NON-EXEMPT TRUST FBO DANIEL C. SUSOTT; and JOHN L. SUSOTT, Plaintiffs,
LAURYN GALINDO, Defendant.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THIS COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER
FILED ON JUNE 27, 2018
E. Kobayashi, United States District Judge.
27, 2018, this Court issued its Order Granting
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
(“6/27/18 Order”). [Dkt. no. 122. On July 5, 2018,
Defendant Lauryn Galindo (“Defendant”) filed her
Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Summary
Judgment Order Filed on June 27, 2018 (“Motion for
Reconsideration”). [Dkt. no. 130.] On July 19, 2018,
Plaintiffs Evan Auld-Susott (“E. Auld-Susott”),
as Trustee for (1) Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust of John
L. Susott and Kathryn C. Susott UAD 8/17/1988 as Restated,
Exempt Trust FBO Daniel C. Susott, and (2) Irrevocable Life
Insurance Trust of John L. Susott and Kathryn C. Susott UAD
8/17/1988 as Restated, Non-Exempt Trust FBO Daniel C. Susott
(“Trusts”); and John L. Susott (“J.
Susott” and collectively “Plaintiffs”)
filed their memorandum in opposition, and Defendant filed her
reply on August 2, 2018. [Dkt. nos. 146, 156.] The Court has
considered the Motion for Reconsideration as a non-hearing
matter pursuant to Rule LR7.2(e) of the Local Rules of
Practice of the United States District Court for the District
of Hawai`i (“Local Rules”). Defendant's
Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied for the reasons
set forth below.
relevant factual and procedural background of this matter is
set forth in the 6/27/18 Order, which ruled that Plaintiffs
are both creditors of non-party Daniel C. Susott (“D.
Susott”) under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 651C-1, and
therefore have standing to pursue their fraudulent conveyance
claim under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 651C-4. 6/27/18 Order,
2018 WL 3148095, at *6. The 6/27/18 Order, inter
alia, denied Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed January 31, 2018 (“Motion”).
[Dkt. no. 80.]
Court has previously stated that a motion for reconsideration
“must accomplish two goals. First, a motion for
reconsideration must demonstrate reasons why the court should
reconsider its prior decision. Second, a motion for
reconsideration must set forth facts or law of a strongly
convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior
decision.” See Davis v. Abercrombie, Civil No.
11-00144 LEK-BMK, 2014 WL 2468348, at *2 (D. Hawaii June 2,
2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). . . .
“Mere disagreement with a previous order is an
insufficient basis for reconsideration.”
Davis, 2014 WL 2468348, at *3 n.4 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Riley v. Nat'l Ass'n of Marine Surveyors,
Inc., Civil No. 14-00135 LEK-RLP, 2014 WL 4794003, at *1
(D. Hawai`i Sept. 25, 2014). Local Rule 60.1 states, in
relevant part: “Motions for reconsideration of
interlocutory orders may be brought only upon the following
grounds: (a) Discovery of new material facts not previously
available; (b) Intervening change in law; [or] (c) Manifest
error of law or fact.” “Further,
‘reconsideration may not be based on evidence and legal
arguments that a movant could have presented at the time of
the challenged decision.'” Navaja v. Honolulu
Acad. of Arts, CIVIL 15-00344 LEK-RLP, 2017 WL 1158238,
at *1 (D. Hawai`i Mar. 28, 2017) (quoting Wereb v. Maui
Cty., 830 F.Supp.2d 1026, 1031 (D. Hawai`i 2011) (citing
Kona Enter., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877,
890 (9th Cir. 2000))).
first asserts that reconsideration of the 6/27/18 Order is
warranted because the Court erred by misconstruing the
Settlement Agreement: “If it had been [properly]
construed, [E. Auld-Susott] would not be a creditor of Daniel
Susott under the [Hawai`i Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
(‘HUFTA')].” [Mem. in Supp. of Motion for
Reconsideration at 6.] Defendant's conclusory statement
merely expresses disagreement with the 6/27/18 Order, and is
not grounds for reconsideration.
Defendant argues the 6/27/18 Order contains a “manifest
error of fact in failing to consider the about $516, 000
present value of the annual payments” to D. Susott.
[Id. at 7.] Defendant is mistaken. The 6/27/18 Order
considered Defendant's contention related to the annual
payments, and concluded they “do not destroy
Plaintiffs' creditor status under HUFTA.” 2018 WL
3148095, at *5. Defendant's disagreement with this
conclusion does not mean Defendant's argument was not
Defendant states: “[s]he believes that this Court made
a manifest error of fact in failing to consider the actual
assignment of the default judgment by John Susott to
John's trust.” [Mem. in Supp. of Motion for
Reconsideration at 7.] Defendant is mistaken. See
6/27/18 Order, 2018 WL 3148095, at *5 & n.6 (analyzing
this issue and concluding, inter alia, that the only
evidence Defendant submitted was inadmissible).
Defendant's disagreement with the Court's conclusion
does not mean Defendant's argument was not considered.
Defendant argues this Court erred by failing to consider
Hughes v. Tower Park Properties, LLC, 803 F.3d 450
(9th Cir. 2015). Defendant asserts Hughes stands for
the proposition that, under California law, “a trust
beneficiary has no standing to sue; only the trustee has such
standing, ” and is relevant because “California
law could be applicable in this case.” [Mem. in Supp.
of Motion for Reconsideration at 10.] The 6/27/18 Order
addressed this issue when it explained that, because
“[u]nder Hawai`i law, a trust beneficiary holds
equitable title to trust property, ” and therefore has
a claim under HUFTA. 2018 WL 3148095, at *5 n.6 (citation
Defendant has not established either a manifest error of law
in the 6/27/18 Order, or any other grounds for
reconsideration, her request for ...