United States District Court, D. Hawaii
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, VACATING
JUDGMENT, AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
E. Kobayashi, United States District Judge.
the court is pro se Plaintiff Justin Mitchell Oliver's
Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No. 8, of the December 5,
2018 Dismissal Order, ECF No. 6, which dismissed Oliver's
Complaint and this action without prejudice but without leave
to amend, for Oliver's failure to state a colorable claim
following reasons, Oliver's Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED. The Dismissal Order and judgment are VACATED.
Complaint, however, is again DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a), for his continued
failure to state a colorable claim for relief. Because
amendment is again futile, this dismissal is with prejudice.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
“[o]n motion and just terms, the court may relieve a
party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence ; (3)
fraud ; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been
satisfied, released or discharged ; or (6) any other reason
that justifies relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Where none
of these factors is present the motion is properly denied.
Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1442 (9th
Cir. 1991). “A motion for reconsideration should not be
granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the
district court is presented with newly discovered evidence,
committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change
in the controlling law, ” and it “may not be used
to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time
when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the
litigation.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos
Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotations marks, citations, and emphasis omitted).
Complaint, Oliver seeks compensation for malicious
prosecution and false imprisonment against the Honorable
Shackley Raffetto, Circuit Judge of the Second Circuit Court,
State of Hawaii, for Judge Raffetto's alleged failure to
dismiss Oliver's state criminal case for an alleged
violation of his right to a speedy trial. This Court
mistakenly assumed that Oliver was challenging Judge
Raffetto's actions in his state criminal conviction in
State v. Oliver, 1PC16-1-000004 (Haw. 1st Cir.
2016), under which Oliver is currently incarcerated for a
probation violation. Based on this, the Court held that
Oliver's speedy trial claims were barred under Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because his criminal
conviction had not been reversed, expunged, set aside, or
otherwise called into question, and a judgment in his favor
in this civil rights action would undermine his state court
conviction. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.
now clarifies that he is not challenging any constitutional
infirmities in his current criminal conviction for which he
is incarcerated, which would be barred under the
Heck Doctrine, but is challenging actions allegedly
taken by Judge Raffetto in State v. Oliver,
2PC02-1-000563 (Haw. 2d Cir. 2002), in which Oliver was
acquitted by reason of insanity on April 10, 2003. Oliver
says that he did not waive his speedy trial rights in that
case and was held for more than two years before his
acquittal by reason of insanity. He states that he was then
held in the Hawaii State Hospital for another two years until
he was released.
on these clarifications and the Court's mistake regarding
the criminal proceeding that formed the basis for its
decision, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The
Clerk is DIRECTED to VACATE the December 5, 2018 Dismissal
Order and judgment and reopen this case.
REQUIRED SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT
on Oliver's clarification and the reopening of this case,
the Court must again screen Oliver's Complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a). Claims
that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for
relief, or seek damages from defendants who are immune from
suit must be dismissed. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing §
1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004
(9th Cir. 2010) (discussing § 1915A(b)).
complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual
allegations are not required, but a complaint must allege
enough facts to provide both “fair notice” of the
claim asserted and “the grounds upon which [that claim]
rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 & n.3 (2007) (citation and quotation marks
omitted). A complaint must “contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir.
2012). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
pleadings must be liberally construed and all doubts should
be resolved in the pro se plaintiff's favor. Hebbe v.
Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations
omitted). If the defects in the complaint can be corrected,
leave to amend must be granted, Lopez, 203 F.3d at
1130; if a claim or complaint cannot be saved by amendment,
dismissal without leave to amend or with prejudice is
appropriate, Sylvia Landfield Tr. v. City of L.A.,
729 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013).