United States District Court, D. Hawaii
CHRISTOPHER ZYDA, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs,
FOUR SEASONS HOTELS AND RESORTS, FOUR SEASONS HOLDINGS, INC., FOUR SEASONS HUALALAI RESORT, HUALALAI RESIDENTIAL, LLC, DBA HUALALAI REALTY; HUALALAI INVESTORS, LLC, KAUPULEHU MAKAI VENTURE, HUALALAI DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, HUALALAI VILLAS & HOMES, HUALALAI INVESTORS, LLC, HUALALAI RENTAL MANAGEMENT, LLC, DOES 1-100, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AS TO FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF (CONDOMINIUM PROPERTY
ACT) IN CLASS PLAINTIFFS' SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES, DECLARATORY, AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
FILED APRIL 30, 2018
E KOBAYASHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
October 18, 2018, Defendants Four Seasons Hotels Ltd., Four
Seasons Holdings, Inc., Hualalai Investors, LLC, Hualalai
Residential LLC, and Hualalai Rental Management, LLC
(“Defendants”), filed their Motion to Dismiss and
for Partial Summary Judgment as to First Claim for Relief
(Condominium Property Act) in Class Plaintiffs' Second
Amended Class Action Complaint for Damages, Declaratory, and
Injunctive Relief Filed April 30, 2018
(“Motion”). [Dkt. no. 118.] Plaintiffs
Christopher Zyda (“Zyda”) and Carol Meyer
(“Meyer” and collectively
“Plaintiffs”), on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated (all collectively
“Class”), filed their memorandum in opposition on
November 1, 2018, and Defendants filed their reply on
December 3, 2018. [Dkt. nos. 125, 131.] Intervenors Bradley
Chipps, Donna Chipps, J. Orin Edson, David Keyes, Doreen
Keyes, Ann Marie Mahoney, James R. Mahoney, Kevin Reedy, H.
Jon Runstad, Judith Runstad, Jonathan Seybold, Patricia
Seybold, and Julie Wrigley filed a statement of no opposition
to the Motion on November 26, 2018. [Dkt. no. 127.]
Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without a
hearing pursuant to Rule LR7.2(d) of the Local Rules of
Practice for the United States District Court for the
District of Hawaii (“Local Rules”). On February
15, 2019, this Court issued an entering order ruling on the
Motion. [Dkt. no. 144.] The instant Order supersedes that
entering order. For the reasons set forth below,
Defendants' Motion is denied as to their request to
dismiss Count I and granted insofar as Defendants are granted
summary judgment as to Count I. Further, in light of this
Court's ruling, the Class is hereby decertified as to
instant case arises from the fees and charges for
unaccompanied guests that were announced at the Hualalai
Resort (“Resort”) in 2015. The operative pleading
in this case is Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Action
Complaint for Damages, Declaratory, and Injunctive Relief
(“Second Amended Complaint”), filed on April 30,
2018. [Dkt. no. 89.] Zyda filed the first two versions of the
complaint in state court, and the state court certified the
Class. [Notice of Removal of Action Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (“Notice of
Removal”), filed 11/1/16 (dkt. no. 1), Decl. of William
Meheula, Exh. 1 (complaint filed on 10/2/15), Exh. 2 (amended
complaint filed on 10/14/16), Exh. 3 (order granting class
certification filed on 10/13/16).] Defendants removed the
case based on diversity jurisdiction, pursuant to the Class
Action Fairness Act. [Notice of Removal at ¶ 16.]
Second Amended Complaint alleges the following claims:
violation of the Condominium Property Act, Haw. Rev. Stat.
Chapter 514B (“Count I”); violation of the
Uniform Land Sales Practices Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 484
(“ULSPA” and “Count II”); unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices, in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-2
(“Count III”); promissory estoppel/detrimental
reliance (“Count IV”); violation of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing (“Count V”);
negligent misrepresentation (“Count VI”);
estoppel (“Count VII”); unjust enrichment
(“Count VIII”); organized crime, pursuant to Haw.
Rev. Stat. Chapter 842 (“Count IX”); and breach
of fiduciary and other common law duties (“Count
X”). Counts II, IX, and X have been dismissed. [Order
granting Defs.' motion to dismiss, filed 9/27/18 (dkt.
no. 109) (“9/27/18 Order”), at 22. Only Count I is
at issue in the instant Motion.
purchased a condominium in the Resort on July 22,
2013. [Defs.' Concise Statement of Facts in
Supp. of Motion, filed 10/18/18 (dkt. no. 119), at ¶ 1;
Pltfs.' Separate and Concise Statement of Facts in Opp.
to Motion, filed 11/26/18 (dkt. no. 129), at ¶ 1
(stating Defs.' ¶ 1 is not disputed).] Count I
alleges Defendants made “material misstatements of fact
and statements made in bad faith on which Plaintiff Meyer
relied when purchasing” her condominium. [Second
Amended Complaint at ¶ 28.] The primary
misrepresentation that Plaintiffs base all of their claims
upon is the alleged promise that the Class members, their
families, and their guests (including renters) would be able
to enjoy the Resort's facilities without paying
additional fees. [Id. at ¶ 10.] Count I seeks
the remedies provided under Chapter 514B, which Plaintiffs
emphasize “must be liberally administered to the end
that the aggrieved parties are put in as good a position as
if the other party had fully performed.” [Id.
at ¶ 29.]
instant Motion, Defendants seek dismissal of, or summary
judgment as to, Count I because Meyer's Chapter 514B
claim is barred by the two-year statute of repose.
Request for Dismissal
Motion seeks both dismissal and summary judgment as to Count
I. At this stage of the case, the Court concludes that the
issues presented in the Motion should be addressed under the
summary judgment standard, rather than the dismissal
standard. In addition, this Court has considered materials
beyond the pleadings. See Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics,
Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018)
(“Generally, district courts may not consider material
outside the pleadings when assessing the sufficiency of a
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.” (citation omitted)), cert. petition
docketed, No. 18-1010 (Feb. 4, 2019). Therefore, the Motion
is denied to the extent it seeks dismissal of Count I.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 514B-94(b)
United States Supreme Court has stated:
[A] statute of limitations creates “a time limit for
suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim
accrued.” Black's Law Dictionary 1546 (9th ed.
2009) (Black's). Measured by this standard, a claim
accrues in a personal-injury or property-damage action
“when the injury occurred or was discovered.”
Black's 1546. . . .
A statute of repose, on the other hand, puts an outer limit
on the right to bring a civil action. That limit is measured
not from the date on which the claim accrues but instead from
the date of the last culpable act or omission of the
defendant. A statute of repose “bar[s] any suit that is
brought after a specified time since the defendant acted
(such as by designing or manufacturing a product), even if
this period ends before the plaintiff has suffered a
resulting injury.” Black's 1546. The statute of
repose limit is “not related to the accrual of any
cause of action; the injury need not have occurred, much less
have been discovered.” 54 C.J.S., Limitations of
Actions § 7, p. 24 (2010) (hereinafter C.J.S.). The
repose provision is therefore equivalent to “a cutoff,
” Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363 (1991), in essence an
“absolute . . . bar” on a defendant's
temporal liability, C.J.S. § 7, at 24.
CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2014)
(some alterations in CTS) (some citations
omitted). This Court has stated that, “under
Hawai`i law, as under federal law, the primary characteristic
of a statute of repose is that it sets an outer time limit
that is an absolute bar to a claim, regardless of whether the
claim has accrued.” Mamea v. United States,
Civil No. 08-00563 LEK-RLP, 2011 WL 4371712, at *8 (D.
Hawai`i Sept. 16, 2011) (comparing Hays v. City &
Cnty. of Honolulu, 81 Hawai`i 391, 393, 917 P.2d 718,
720 (1996); Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P'ship,
634 F.3d 524, 537 (9th Cir. 2011)).
514B-94 states, ...