Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Zyda v. Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts

United States District Court, D. Hawaii

March 7, 2019

CHRISTOPHER ZYDA, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs,
v.
FOUR SEASONS HOTELS AND RESORTS, FOUR SEASONS HOLDINGS, INC., FOUR SEASONS HUALALAI RESORT, HUALALAI RESIDENTIAL, LLC, DBA HUALALAI REALTY; HUALALAI INVESTORS, LLC, KAUPULEHU MAKAI VENTURE, HUALALAI DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, HUALALAI VILLAS & HOMES, HUALALAI INVESTORS, LLC, HUALALAI RENTAL MANAGEMENT, LLC, DOES 1-100, Defendants.

          ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF (CONDOMINIUM PROPERTY ACT) IN CLASS PLAINTIFFS' SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES, DECLARATORY, AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FILED APRIL 30, 2018

          LESLIE E KOBAYASHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         On October 18, 2018, Defendants Four Seasons Hotels Ltd., Four Seasons Holdings, Inc., Hualalai Investors, LLC, Hualalai Residential LLC, and Hualalai Rental Management, LLC (“Defendants”), filed their Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment as to First Claim for Relief (Condominium Property Act) in Class Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Damages, Declaratory, and Injunctive Relief Filed April 30, 2018 (“Motion”). [Dkt. no. 118.] Plaintiffs Christopher Zyda (“Zyda”) and Carol Meyer (“Meyer” and collectively “Plaintiffs”), on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated (all collectively “Class”), filed their memorandum in opposition on November 1, 2018, and Defendants filed their reply on December 3, 2018. [Dkt. nos. 125, 131.] Intervenors Bradley Chipps, Donna Chipps, J. Orin Edson, David Keyes, Doreen Keyes, Ann Marie Mahoney, James R. Mahoney, Kevin Reedy, H. Jon Runstad, Judith Runstad, Jonathan Seybold, Patricia Seybold, and Julie Wrigley filed a statement of no opposition to the Motion on November 26, 2018. [Dkt. no. 127.]

         The Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without a hearing pursuant to Rule LR7.2(d) of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii (“Local Rules”). On February 15, 2019, this Court issued an entering order ruling on the Motion. [Dkt. no. 144.] The instant Order supersedes that entering order. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion is denied as to their request to dismiss Count I and granted insofar as Defendants are granted summary judgment as to Count I. Further, in light of this Court's ruling, the Class is hereby decertified as to Count I.

         BACKGROUND

         The instant case arises from the fees and charges for unaccompanied guests that were announced at the Hualalai Resort (“Resort”) in 2015. The operative pleading in this case is Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Damages, Declaratory, and Injunctive Relief (“Second Amended Complaint”), filed on April 30, 2018. [Dkt. no. 89.] Zyda filed the first two versions of the complaint in state court, and the state court certified the Class. [Notice of Removal of Action Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (“Notice of Removal”), filed 11/1/16 (dkt. no. 1), Decl. of William Meheula, Exh. 1 (complaint filed on 10/2/15), Exh. 2 (amended complaint filed on 10/14/16), Exh. 3 (order granting class certification filed on 10/13/16).] Defendants removed the case based on diversity jurisdiction, pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act. [Notice of Removal at ¶ 16.]

         The Second Amended Complaint alleges the following claims: violation of the Condominium Property Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 514B (“Count I”); violation of the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 484 (“ULSPA” and “Count II”); unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices, in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-2 (“Count III”); promissory estoppel/detrimental reliance (“Count IV”); violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing (“Count V”); negligent misrepresentation (“Count VI”); estoppel (“Count VII”); unjust enrichment (“Count VIII”); organized crime, pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 842 (“Count IX”); and breach of fiduciary and other common law duties (“Count X”). Counts II, IX, and X have been dismissed. [Order granting Defs.' motion to dismiss, filed 9/27/18 (dkt. no. 109) (“9/27/18 Order”), at 22.[1] Only Count I is at issue in the instant Motion.

         Meyer purchased a condominium in the Resort on July 22, 2013.[2] [Defs.' Concise Statement of Facts in Supp. of Motion, filed 10/18/18 (dkt. no. 119), at ¶ 1; Pltfs.' Separate and Concise Statement of Facts in Opp. to Motion, filed 11/26/18 (dkt. no. 129), at ¶ 1 (stating Defs.' ¶ 1 is not disputed).] Count I alleges Defendants made “material misstatements of fact and statements made in bad faith on which Plaintiff Meyer relied when purchasing” her condominium. [Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 28.] The primary misrepresentation that Plaintiffs base all of their claims upon is the alleged promise that the Class members, their families, and their guests (including renters) would be able to enjoy the Resort's facilities without paying additional fees. [Id. at ¶ 10.] Count I seeks the remedies provided under Chapter 514B, which Plaintiffs emphasize “must be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved parties are put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed.” [Id. at ¶ 29.]

         In the instant Motion, Defendants seek dismissal of, or summary judgment as to, Count I because Meyer's Chapter 514B claim is barred by the two-year statute of repose.

         DISCUSSION

         I. Request for Dismissal

         The Motion seeks both dismissal and summary judgment as to Count I. At this stage of the case, the Court concludes that the issues presented in the Motion should be addressed under the summary judgment standard, rather than the dismissal standard. In addition, this Court has considered materials beyond the pleadings. See Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Generally, district courts may not consider material outside the pleadings when assessing the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (citation omitted)), cert. petition docketed, No. 18-1010 (Feb. 4, 2019). Therefore, the Motion is denied to the extent it seeks dismissal of Count I.

         II. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 514B-94(b)

         The United States Supreme Court has stated:

[A] statute of limitations creates “a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued.” Black's Law Dictionary 1546 (9th ed. 2009) (Black's). Measured by this standard, a claim accrues in a personal-injury or property-damage action “when the injury occurred or was discovered.” Black's 1546. . . .
A statute of repose, on the other hand, puts an outer limit on the right to bring a civil action. That limit is measured not from the date on which the claim accrues but instead from the date of the last culpable act or omission of the defendant. A statute of repose “bar[s] any suit that is brought after a specified time since the defendant acted (such as by designing or manufacturing a product), even if this period ends before the plaintiff has suffered a resulting injury.” Black's 1546. The statute of repose limit is “not related to the accrual of any cause of action; the injury need not have occurred, much less have been discovered.” 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions § 7, p. 24 (2010) (hereinafter C.J.S.). The repose provision is therefore equivalent to “a cutoff, ” Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363 (1991), in essence an “absolute . . . bar” on a defendant's temporal liability, C.J.S. § 7, at 24.[3]

CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2014) (some alterations in CTS) (some citations omitted).[4] This Court has stated that, “under Hawai`i law, as under federal law, the primary characteristic of a statute of repose is that it sets an outer time limit that is an absolute bar to a claim, regardless of whether the claim has accrued.” Mamea v. United States, Civil No. 08-00563 LEK-RLP, 2011 WL 4371712, at *8 (D. Hawai`i Sept. 16, 2011) (comparing Hays v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 81 Hawai`i 391, 393, 917 P.2d 718, 720 (1996); Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P'ship, 634 F.3d 524, 537 (9th Cir. 2011)).

         Section 514B-94 states, ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.