United States District Court, D. Hawaii
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT BRYSON CHOW'S MOTION FOR
E. KOBAYASHI UNITED STATES JUDGE
Rudy Akoni Galima and Roxana Beatriz Galima
(“Plaintiffs”) filed their Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on Counts I and II (Wrongful Foreclosure and
Violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act)
(“Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment”),
January 19, 2018, and Defendant Bryson Chow
(“Chow”) filed his Motion for Summary Judgment
Regarding the Fair Debt Collection Practices Claim in Count
II of the Third Amended Complaint [Dkt. 88]
(“Chow's Motion for Summary Judgment”), on
January 24, 2018. [Dkt. nos. 115, 118.] On December 31, 2018,
this Court issued an order that, inter alia, denied
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count II
and denied Chow's Motion for Summary Judgment
(“12/31/18 Order”). [Dkt. no. 173. Before the Court
is Chow's motion for partial reconsideration of the
12/31/18 Order (“Motion for Reconsideration”),
filed on January 9, 2019. [Dkt. no. 177.] Plaintiffs filed
their memorandum in opposition on January 24, 2019, and Chow
filed his reply on February 6, 2019. [Dkt. nos. 181, 186.]
Court has considered the Motion for Reconsideration as a
non-hearing matter pursuant to Rule LR7.2(e) of the Local
Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for
the District of Hawaii (“Local Rules”). For the
reasons set forth below, Chow's Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby denied because the discovery rule
applies to Plaintiffs' remaining claim against Chow.
relevant factual and procedural background of this case is
set forth in the 12/31/18 Order. Only the facts that are
relevant to the Motion for Reconsideration will be repeated
AOAO is the condominium association for the Palm Court,
Increment 1C, a project in which Plaintiffs previously owned
a unit (“Unit”). After Plaintiffs became
delinquent in their condominium association fees, the AOAO,
through its attorneys (one of whom was Chow), engaged in
various collection efforts to recover those fees. The AOAO
ultimately placed a lien on the Unit and sold the Unit
through a nonjudicial foreclosure process, which was
conducted pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 667, Part I.
Chow represented the AOAO in the foreclosure process. He
conducted a public auction on October 19, 2010, and the AOAO
- the only bidder - sold the Unit to itself for one dollar.
See 12/31/18 Order, 2018 WL 6841818, at *1-5. A quitclaim
deed conveying the Unit from the AOAO to itself was recorded
on November 9, 2010. See Id. at *5 n.6. However,
Plaintiffs did not file this action until January 12, 2016.
See Notice of Removal, filed 1/22/16 (dkt. no. 1), Decl. of
David R. Major, Exh. A (First Amended Complaint, filed on
January 15, 2016 in state court).
only remaining claim against Chow is their claim alleging
that he violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq.
(“Count II”). [Third Amended Complaint, filed
5/22/17 (dkt. no. 88), at ¶¶ 36-40.] FDCPA claims
are subject to a one-year limitations period, but the
discovery rule applies to the determination of when the
statute of limitations begins to run. 12/31/18 Order, 2018 WL
6841818, at *14 (some citations omitted) (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692k(d); Lyons v. Michael & Assocs., 824
F.3d 1169, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2016)). Plaintiffs assert their
FDCPA claim is timely because they did not know, and could
not reasonably have known, about their claim against Chow
until December 2015. See Separate & Concise Statement of
Material Facts in Supp. of Pltfs.' Motion
(“Pltfs.' CSOF”), filed 1/19/18 (dkt. no.
116), Decl. of Rudy Akoni Galima (“Galima Decl.”)
at ¶ 22.
Plaintiffs' request and Chow's request for summary
judgment as to Count II were denied. The 12/31/18 Order
addressed numerous issues related to Count II, but only one
is relevant to the Motion for Reconsideration. This Court
found that there are genuine issues of material fact that
preclude summary judgment as to the issue of whether
Plaintiffs' FDCPA claim is timely, in light of the
discovery rule. 12/31/18 Order, 2018 WL 6841818, at *15.
Motion for Reconsideration, Chow argues reconsideration is
necessary because this Court failed to address his argument
that Plaintiffs' lack of knowledge about the law cannot
be used to invoke the discovery rule to delay the running of
the statute of limitations. Chow urges this Court to:
reconsider the 12/31/18 Order; conclude that Plaintiffs'
FDCPA claim is time-barred; and grant summary judgment in his
favor as to Count II.
brings his Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Local Rule
60.1(c), [Mem. in Supp. of Motion for Reconsideration at 3, ]
which states: “Motions for reconsideration of
interlocutory orders may be brought only upon the following
grounds . . . (c) Manifest error of law or fact.” This
Court has previously stated a motion for reconsideration
“must accomplish two goals. First, a motion for
reconsideration must demonstrate reasons why the court should
reconsider its prior decision. Second, a motion for
reconsideration must set forth facts or law of a strongly
convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior
decision.” See Davis v. Abercrombie, Civil No.
11-00144 LEK-BMK, 2014 WL 2468348, at *2 (D. Hawaii June 2,
2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). . . .
“Mere disagreement with a previous order is an
insufficient basis for reconsideration.” Davis, 2014 WL
2468348, at *3 n.4 (citations and internal quotation marks
Heu v. Waldorf=Astoria Mgmt. LLC, CIVIL 17-00365
LEK-RLP, 2018 WL 2011905, at *1 (D. Hawai`i Apr. 30, 2018)
(alteration in Heu) ...