United States District Court, D. Hawaii
MICHAEL C. GREENSPON, Plaintiff,
AIG SPECIALTY INSURANCE CO F/K/A CHARTIS SPECIALTY INSURANCE CO.; AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC.; PROMMIS SOLUTIONS HOLDING CORP. N/K/A OLD ALABAMA CLOSING COPR.; MCCORRISTON MILLER MUKAI MACKINNON LLP; and DOES 10-30, Defendants.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 1) RECONSIDER MOTION TO
REMAND OR 2) STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING STATE COURT
DERRICK K. WATSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court is pro se Plaintiff Michael Greenspon's motion
for reconsideration of the denial of remand or to stay
proceedings. Dkt. No. 38. The Court finds these matters
suitable for disposition without a hearing, pursuant to Local
Rule 7.2(d). For the reasons discussed below, Greenspon's
alternative requests are DENIED.
Complaint, originally filed in state court, seeks a
declaratory judgment regarding AIG's and AIG
Specialty's insurance coverage obligations with respect
to a default judgment entered in Greenspon's favor in a
2014 state-court lawsuit (2014 Lawsuit) against AIG's
insured, Prommis Solutions Holding Corp (PSHC), and
Prommis' wholly owned subsidiary, Cal Western.
Id., Ex. 1.
November 2018, Defendants American International Group (AIG),
AIG Specialty, and McCorriston, Miller, Mukai, MacKinnon LLP
(M4) removed this action to this Court. Dkt. No. 1. Greenspon
filed a Motion to Remand based on: (1) lack of jurisdiction
because of the incomplete diversity of the parties and (2)
discretionary considerations, including the existence of
duplicative, intertwined state-court matters. Dkt. No. 10. On
February 25, 2019, this Court denied Greenspon's Motion
for Remand (February 2019 Order), concluding, inter
alia, that (1) Greenspon had not asserted a claim
against the sole in-state party, M4, rendering the law
firm's presence as a defendant improper and resulting in
its exclusion when determining diversity; and (2)
Greenspon's pending state-court matters against
defendants other than those named here did not relate
directly to the declaratory judgment action before this
Court, and the only possibly related state-court matter, the
2014 Lawsuit, was no longer pending, having concluded with
the entry of default judgment. Dkt. No. 22.
March 13, 2019, Greenspon moved in state court to amend the
findings of facts and conclusions of law in the
previously-concluded 2014 Lawsuit. Defendant's Opposition
to Motion to Remand (Opp.), Dkt. No. 45, at 4. The state
court promptly denied the motion to amend. Id. at 5.
On March 25, 2019, Defendant AIG, who was not party to the
2014 Lawsuit, initiated a Special Proceeding (2019 Special
Proceeding) in state court to set aside the default judgment
in the 2014 Lawsuit as it relates to Cal-Western.
Id. Greenspon thereafter counterclaimed against AIG
in the 2019 Special Proceeding asserting some claims similar
to those in the declaratory judgment action before this
Court. Id. at 6. The state court consolidated the
2014 lawsuit with the 2019 Special Proceeding (Consolidated
State Court Proceeding). Id. at 7.
in the Consolidated State Court Proceeding are
Greenspon's motion for summary judgment as to AIG's
complaint seeking to set aside the default judgement against
Cal Western and AIG's Motion to Dismiss Greenspon's
counterclaims. Id. On April 18, 2019, Greenspon
filed the instant “Motion to 1) Reconsider Motion to
Remand or 2) to Stay Proceedings Pending State Court
Action” (Motion). Dkt. No. 38.
to LR60.1, motions seeking reconsideration of interlocutory
orders may only be brought on the basis of newly discovered
material facts not previously available, an intervening
change in law, or manifest error of law or fact. Where
reconsideration is sought based on manifest error, the motion
must be brought within 14 days of the order it challenges.
power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent
in every court to control disposition of the cases on its
docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am.
Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). “The exertion of
this power calls for the exercise of sound discretion.”
CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir.
1962); see Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706
(1997) (“The District Court has broad discretion to
stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its
own docket.”); Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398
F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A district court has
discretionary power to stay proceedings in its own
court[.]”). When a stay is requested because of pending
proceedings that bear on the case, the Court may grant a stay
in the interests of the efficiency of its own docket and
fairness to the parties. See Leyva v. Certified Grocers
of Cal. Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1979); see
also Mediterranean Enters., Inc. v. Sangyong Corp., 708
F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1983) (“A trial court may,
with propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and
the fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an
action before it, pending resolution of independent
proceedings which bear upon the case.”).
Ninth Circuit has set out the following framework for
analyzing motions to stay, pending resolution of related
Where it is proposed that a pending proceeding be stayed, the
competing interests which will be affected by the granting or
refusal to grant a stay must be weighed. Among those
competing interests are the possible damage which may result
from the granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity which a
party may suffer in being required to go forward, and the
orderly course of justice measured in terms of the