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Emrit v. Desert Parkway Behavioral Hospital

United States District Court, D. Hawaii

June 6, 2019



          Leslie E. Kobayashi, United States District Judge

         On March 15, 2019, pro se Plaintiff Ronald Satish Emrit (“Plaintiff”) filed his Amended Complaint. [Dkt. no. 8.] For the reasons set forth below, the Amended Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice. In other words, all of Plaintiff's claims in his Amended Complaint are dismissed, and he does not have leave to file a second amended complaint. Additionally, Plaintiff's Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees and Costs, [filed 11/9/18 (dkt. no. 2), ] is denied as moot, and the Clerk's Office is directed to close this case upon entering this Order.


         A summary of the factual background in this matter is set forth in this Court's January 29, 2019 order (“1/29/19 Order”), therefore, only relevant facts will be repeated herein. [Dkt. no. 6.[1] In the 1/29/19 Order, this Court dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff's claims in his original complaint based on Plaintiff's failure to allege that either venue or personal jurisdiction over Defendant Desert Parkway Behavioral Hospital (“Defendant”) was appropriate.[2] [Id. at 14.] Plaintiff was granted leave to amend his complaint, but was warned that he must allege sufficient facts to establish that: venue and personal jurisdiction over Defendant are appropriate; this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims; and Plaintiff's claims were not duplicative of another action that appeared to be pending before a federal district court in California. [Id. at 12.] Plaintiff was warned to include “all of the claims that he wishes to allege, and all of the allegations that his claims are based upon, even if he previously presented them in the original Complaint.” [Id. at 13.]

         Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges that, in 2016, he was a patient at Defendant's facility after he experienced suicidal ideations. [Amended Complaint at ¶ 22.] Although he did not complete his partial hospitalization program (“PHP”) “due to circumstances beyond his control, ” Plaintiff alleges he should have been placed in the intensive outpatient therapy program (“IOP”) as an alternative to completing the PHP. [Id. at ¶ 24.] While he was at Defendant's facility, Plaintiff met a patient named “Amibebe, ” [id. at ¶ 25, ] who threatened Plaintiff after he witnessed a verbal altercation between Amibebe and another patient named “Amy.” [Id. at ¶¶ 28-29.] Plaintiff alleges he also had a romantic relationship with another patient named “Shyane Taylor Rios, ” who stayed with Plaintiff for a brief period of time at his personal residence in Las Vegas, Nevada, which he shared with Nicole Rocio Leal-Mendez.[3] [Id. at ¶¶ 30-31.] Plaintiff alleges Ms. Rios damaged Plaintiff's vehicle, and caused a dispute between Plaintiff and Ms. Leal-Mendez, which resulted in Ms. Leal-Mendez asking Plaintiff to leave.[4] [Id. at ¶ 31.]

         Plaintiff alleges a claim for: breach of contract and unjust enrichment based on Defendant's alleged failure to place Plaintiff in IOP and possibly Plaintiff's loss of housing resulting from his involvement with Ms. Rios (“Count I”); negligence or negligence per se based on Plaintiff's loss of housing caused by Ms. Rios, for which Plaintiff alleges Defendant is vicariously liable (“Count II”); and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) (“Count III”), presumably upon the same factual allegations set forth above.[5]


         As stated in the 1/29/19 Order, a civil action commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to mandatory screening, and shall be dismissed if the court determines that the action is “frivolous or malicious[, ] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or seeks relief against a defendant who is immune from suit. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

This district court has stated that Dismissal is proper when there is either a “‘lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged.'” UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). A plaintiff must allege “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Weber v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 521 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). This tenet - that the court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint - “is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A]llegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.”). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Factual allegations that only permit the Court to infer “the mere possibility of misconduct” do not show that the pleader is entitled to relief as required by [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 8. Id. at 679.

Emrit v. Sec'y of Haw., CIVIL NO. 17-00504 DKW-RLP, 2018 WL 264851, at *1 (D. Hawai`i Jan. 2, 2018), appeal dismissed, No. 18-15224, 2018 WL 2222607 (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 2018).

         Plaintiff is pro se; therefore this Court liberally construes his filings. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted); see Johnson v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1011 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because [the plaintiff] proceeded pro se before the district court, we must construe his complaints liberally even when evaluating it under the Iqbal standard.” (citation omitted)). In this circumstance, “[l]eave to amend should be granted unless the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts, and should be granted more liberally to pro se plaintiffs.” Johnson, 653 F.3d at 1011 (alteration in Johnson) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “Dismissal without leave to amend is proper if it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by amendment.” Gingery v. City of Glendale, 831 F.3d 1222, 1231 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation and quotation marks omitted).


         This Court has screened Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and finds that Plaintiff has not addressed the deficiencies identified in the 1/29/19 Order as to venue and personal jurisdiction.

         I. Venue and ...

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