United States District Court, D. Hawaii
DAVID VERDEN WILLIAMS, JR., FED. REG. #99700-022, Plaintiff,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, Defendant.
ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DENYING MOTION
FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Michael Seabright Chief United States District Judge
the court is pro se Plaintiff David Verden Williams,
Jr.'s (“Williams”) first amended complaint
(“FAC”) brought pursuant to Bivens v. Si x
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971). Williams alleges that the Federal Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”) violated his constitutional
rights as a pretrial detainee at the Federal Detention
Center, Honolulu (“FDC Honolulu”) on or about
January 26, 2012.
following reasons, the FAC is DISMISSED for Williams'
failure to state a colorable claim for relief. Williams is
granted leave to amend his claims in Count I only, on or
before July 22, 2019. Count II is DISMISSED with prejudice.
Williams' Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED.
court must conduct a pre-Answer screening of all pleadings
brought by prisoners, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a). Claims or complaints that are
frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or
seek damages from defendants who are immune from suit must be
dismissed. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,
1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Rhodes v.
Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010).
under §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a) involves the same
standard of review as that used under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d
1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680
F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a
complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Id. The “mere possibility of
misconduct” or an “unadorned, the
defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation” falls short
of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. at
678-79; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d
962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
litigants' pleadings must be liberally construed and all
doubts should be resolved in their favor. Hebbe v.
Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations
omitted). The court must grant leave to amend if it appears
the plaintiff can correct the defects in the complaint,
Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130, but if a claim or complaint
cannot be saved by amendment, dismissal with prejudice is
appropriate. Sylvia Landfield Tr. v. City of L.A.,
729 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013).
commenced this action on February 12, 2019, alleging that he
was assaulted by another inmate at the FDC Honolulu in 2012,
due to negligence by an FDC Honolulu psychiatrist, and that
he was then denied medical care. See Compl., ECF No.
1. The court dismissed Williams' original Complaint on
April 22, 2019, for failure to state a colorable claim for
relief with leave granted to amend. Order, ECF No. 21
(“April 22, 2019 Order”). In the April 22, 2019
Order, the court provided Williams detailed guidance
regarding the deficiencies in his claims and the relevant
legal standards that appeared to apply to them. See
id., PageID #105-111. The court directed Williams to
submit only “one coherent pleading” that
explained his claims in an organized manner, rather than
continuing to assert his claims in serially-filed letters,
motions, and pleadings. Id. at PageID #94. Williams
was notified that being granted leave to amend was “not
an open invitation” to add new claims, but a direction
to provide enough detail for the court to understand the
claims that he had already asserted, detailing who the
Defendants are and what they did or failed to do that
violated his civil rights. Id. at PageID #104.
has disregarded the court's instructions and guidance in
large part. Since filing the FAC, Williams has filed a notice
of appeal of the April 22, 2019 Order (ECF No. 26),
ex parte letter seeking legal guidance (ECF No. 27), a
Request for Release from Custody (ECF No. 32), and a Motion
for Appointment of Counsel and a supplemental Statement of
Facts of the Case (ECF No. 33). In the FAC, Williams names
improper defendants again, alleges new claims not raised in
the original Complaint, and fails to allege sufficient facts
to support these new claims.
alleges two causes of action. In Count I, Williams, who says
that he is schizophrenic, alleges that a “tactical
team” at the FDC Honolulu used excessive force against
him several times when they forced him into Special Housing
Unit (“SHU”) cells with inmates that he alleges
posed a risk to his safety. ECF No. 25, PageID #145. He says
the team “would slam [him] against walls and to the
ground . . . violently forcing [him] into cells with several
inmates.” Id. at PageID #148. Williams
provides no further details regarding these incidents, such
as: (1) when they occurred; (2) why a tactical team was
required to move him from a suicide cell to the SHU, rather
than moving him by his own volition once he was no longer
suicidal; (3) on whose orders he was moved: (4) who composed
the tactical team; and (5) why he refused to be housed with
these other inmates, that is, why it was inappropriate for
him to be housed with these particular inmates.
further alleges that, on January 26, 2012, BOP and/or FDC
Honolulu officials negligently housed him with a
“known, violent inmate” who attacked him when
Williams refused his demand for oral sex, fracturing
William's skull and nose. Id. Williams claims
that he incurred brain damage and suffers from post-traumatic
stress disorder (“PTSD”) as a result of the
assault. He directs the court to his many other documents in
the record for further details regarding this alleged attack
and resulting mental disabilities. Williams no longer alleges
that he was denied medical care after this assault.
Count II, Williams alleges that “corrupt officers at
F.D.C. Honolulu were involved in placing torture chemicals in
food trays repeatedly.” Id., PageID #146. He
says the BOP “willfully and deliberately allowed this
inhumane activity at F.D.C. Honolulu.” Id.
Williams says this happened daily, although he does not say
exactly when this occurred. He claims that these “non
lethal torture chemicals” caused a burning flesh odor
to emanate from his chest and body, id. at PageID
#148, and that he lost 52 lbs. from these “burnings,
” id. at PageID #146. He says that Lieutenant
Kim told him, “I never put anything in anyones [sic]
seeks $20 million in compensatory damages. Id. at
court informed Williams in the April 22, 2019 Order,
Bivens recognized for the first time an implied
cause of action for damages against federal actors in their
individual capacity for violating a plaintiff's civil
rights that is analogous to a suit brought against state
actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Vega v. United
States, 881 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2018). To state a
Bivens claim for damages, a plaintiff must allege
facts showing that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States was violated,  and (2) the
alleged deprivation was committed by a federal actor. Van
Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991).