United States District Court, D. Hawaii
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO
MICHAEL SEABRIGHT CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the court is pro se Plaintiff Mark Vincent Becker's
prisoner civil rights Complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Becker alleges that Defendants Maui Community
Correctional Center (“MCCC”); MCCC physician, Dr.
Carolyn Mee; and MCCC nurse, Jenifer Lopez, violated his
civil rights while he was a pretrial detainee at MCCC. Becker
is now incarcerated at the Halawa Correctional Facility
following reasons, the Complaint is DISMISSED for failure to
state a colorable claim for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a). Becker may file an
amended pleading on or before July 26, 2019.
court must conduct a pre-Answer screening of all
prisoners' pleadings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a). Claims or complaints that are
frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or
seek damages from defendants who are immune from suit must be
dismissed. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,
1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Rhodes v. Robi
nson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010).
under §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a) involves the same
standard of review as that used under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Wati son v. Carter, 668 F.3d
1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); Wi lhelm v. Rotman, 680
F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a
complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Id. The “mere possibility of
misconduct” or an “unadorned, the
defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation” falls short
of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. at
678-79; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d
962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“requires only ‘a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gi bson,
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “Specific facts are not
necessary.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
93 (2007). The court must accept the allegations of the
complaint as true, i d. at 94, and construe the
pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974),
overruled on other grounds by Davi s v. Scherer, 468
U.S. 183 (1984).
litigants' pleadings must be liberally construed and all
doubts should be resolved in their favor. Hebbe v.
Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations
omitted). The court must grant leave to amend if it appears
the plaintiff can correct the defects in the complaint,
Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130, but if a claim or complaint
cannot be saved by amendment, dismissal with prejudice is
appropriate. Sylvia Landfield Tr. v. City of L.A.,
729 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013).
complained of dizziness and headaches for approximately six
weeks after he was admitted as a pretrial detainee at MCCC,
in or about late 2017 or early 2018. Becker alleges these
symptoms were caused by Dr. Mee's and Lopez's refusal
to give him a full dosage of Coumadin, a blood thinner. He
claims that Dr. Mee and Lopez told him that MCCC policy
requires that inmates receiving Coumadin are started on a
lower dose that is slowly increased until it reaches the
appropriate dosage level. Becker says that Dr. Mee has no
knowledge of cardiology, and asserts that this was confirmed
by the “State[']s cardiologist visit (Aloha
Cardiology)” and by the CAT Scan that he received on
January 19, 2019, at the Pali Momi Medical Center, which
revealed that he had suffered a stroke as a result of a blood
clot. Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID #4. Becker does not allege
when he suffered a stroke. He seeks $500, 000 in damages.
brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He
alleges Lopez and Dr. Mee violated his rights under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. To state a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was
violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by
a person acting under the color of state law. See West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
1983 also requires an actual connection or link between a
defendant's actions and the plaintiff's alleged
deprivation. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.
362, 371-72, 377 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d
165, 167 (9th Cir. 1980). “A person
‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a
constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if
he does an affirmative act, participates in another's
affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is
legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which
complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d
740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). A plaintiff must allege that he
suffered a specific injury as a result of a particular
defendant's conduct and an affirmative link between the
injury and the violation of his rights.