United States District Court, D. Hawaii
DOUGLAS B. HACKETT, Plaintiff,
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, FKA THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF THE CWALT, INC., ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2006-OA10 MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-OA10. Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AND DENYING
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
DERRICK K. WATSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
April 1, 2019, Plaintiff Douglas B. Hackett, proceeding pro
se, filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) against Defendant
Bank of New York Mellon (“BONY”), alleging that
BONY effectively stole his real property and violated his
right to due process through its allegedly improper and
fraudulent foreclosure of his home. Hackett also filed a
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). Hackett seeks
the return of his real property, an injunction to prevent his
eviction, compensatory damages, and the return of mortgage
April 16, 2019, BONY moved to dismiss the FAC on various
grounds, including the applicability of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine and res judicata. Because
the claims and relief sought in the FAC are barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED, and the FAC is DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Because amendment would be futile, leave to
amend is DENIED. Hackett's motion for a TRO (or
preliminary injunction) is DENIED as moot.
2006, Hackett purchased a home at 82-955 Aka Ala Street,
Captain Cook, Hawaii (the subject property). Motion to
Dismiss (MTD), Dkt. No. 23, Ex. A, Signed Promissory Note.
The subject property was purchased through a mortgage loan
(Mortgage) from Countrywide Home Loans. Id. The
Mortgage was then assigned to Defendant BONY. Id.,
Assignment of Mortgage. On March 6, 2012, BONY commenced
judicial foreclosure proceedings in the Circuit Court of the
Third Circuit, State of Hawaii, Civil No. 12-1-140K. FAC, Ex
On October 25, 2016, the State court issued its Findings of
Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting [BONY's]
Third Motion for Summary Judgment for Foreclosure Against All
Defendants and for Interlocutory Decree of Foreclosure. MTD,
Ex. C; Ex. L, Docket Report, Entry #245.
subsequently filed several actions related to this
foreclosure in various courts, including State-court motions,
bankruptcy court proceedings, and another civil case in the
Federal District Court for the District of Hawaii, which
Judge Seabright dismissed on August 7, 2017 on the basis of
res judicata. See MTD, Ex. L; Hackett v.
Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 16-cv-00358-JMS-RLP (D.
January 14, 2019, Hackett initiated the instant suit, filing
a Complaint and Motion for Injunctive Relief (TRO). Dkt. No.
1. During the February 28, 2019 status conference on
Hackett's TRO, the Court instructed Hackett to consider
the preclusive effect of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
in deciding how to proceed. Dkt. No. 12.
filed an Amended Complaint (FAC) on April 1, 2019. Dkt. No.
19. Therein, Hackett asserts thirteen counts against BONY,
alleging various inexact causes of action, which the Court
here seeks to interpret. Id. First, Hackett alleges the
loss of real and personal property under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. Second, Hackett claims
that BONY, and possibly its predecessors, perpetrated fraud
on the courts in obtaining the foreclosure of the subject
specifically, Hackett alleges that he tendered full payment
of the Promissory Note to BONY by presenting an
“international promissory note” on March 28,
2018, two years after the termination of the foreclosure
proceedings in the Third Circuit. TRO Reply, Dkt. No. 37, Ex.
1. He also appears to allege that he sold the subject
property to himself at some point, such that the foreclosure
of the property was a violation of his alter ego's (the
purchaser's) rights. MTD Opposition, Dkt. No. 35. Hackett
supports these assertions with documents that resemble legal
instruments but are not, including a notarized
“financing statement” securing the purchase of
the subject property in a sale from Hackett to himself; a
document prepared by Hackett wherein “DOUGLAS BRUCE
HACKETT” grants exclusive power of attorney to
“Douglas Bruce Hackett”; and a “Legal
Notice” disclaiming any law enforcement efforts against
him. MTD Opposition, Ex. 1.
with the FAC, Hackett filed a second TRO. Id.
Hackett seeks injunctive relief to prevent BONY from evicting
him from the subject property. TRO Motion at 1. In support of
this Motion, Hackett attaches a “Notice to
Vacate” issued by a law firm representing BONY, the
titleholder of the subject property, dated May 10, 2019.
Id., Ex. 1.
construing the FAC, apart from the claims brought under the
Constitution, it appears that Hackett's claims sound in
fraud. Among other things, Hackett seeks the return of his
real property, an injunction to prevent his eviction and
monetary damages in the amount of $1, 620, 000. FAC at 48.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents
Hackett from bringing some or all of his claims. “The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes that federal
district courts generally lack subject matter jurisdiction to
review state court judgments.” Fontana Empire Ctr.,
LLC v. City of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir.
2002) (citing Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)). The Court, therefore,
construes this argument as one challenging the Court's
subject matter jurisdiction, which is properly brought under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) (concerning lack of subject matter