United States District Court, D. Hawaii
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
E. Kobayashi District Judge.
22, 2019, the Court issued the Order: 1) Granting
Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment; and 2)
Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
(“7/22/19 Order”). [Dkt. no. 150.] On August 19,
2019, pro se Plaintiff Claudia Rohr (“Plaintiff”)
filed a motion for reconsideration of the 7/22/19 Order,
which was denied in an entering order issued on August 27,
2019 (“8/27/19 EO”). [Dkt. nos. 152.] Also on
August 27, the Judgment in a Civil Case
(“Judgment”) was entered, pursuant to the 7/22/19
Order and the 8/27/19 EO.
the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment
(“Motion”), filed on September 24, 2019. [Dkt.
no. 154.] Defendant Crime Victims Compensation Commission of
the State of Hawai`i (“Defendant” or
“Commission”) filed its memorandum in opposition
on October 8, 2019, and Plaintiff filed her reply on October
22, 2019. [Dkt. nos. 156, 157.] On November 5, 2019,
Plaintiff filed a document that is titled as a motion, but,
for the reasons set forth below, is construed as a
supplemental memorandum in support of the Motion. [Dkt. no.
158.] The Court has considered the Motion as a non-hearing
matter pursuant to Rule LR7.1(d) of the Local Rules of
Practice for the United States District Court for the
District of Hawaii (“Local Rules”).
Plaintiff's Motion is hereby denied for the reasons set
relevant factual and procedural history of this case is set
forth in the 7/22/19 Order, and only the portions that are
relevant to the instant Motion will be repeated here.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, [filed 6/6/16 (dkt. no.
14), ] alleged a single claim - violation of Title II, Part A
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(“ADA”), as amended by the Americans with
Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), 42
U.S.C. §§ 12131-34, and its implementing
regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35 (“Title II
Claim”). Plaintiff brought her claim as the sole
beneficiary on behalf of her deceased husband, Scott Leland
Andrews (“Andrews”). [7/22/19 Order at 2-3 &
Title II Claim arises from two applications for benefits that
Andrews submitted to the Commission, one related to an April
21, 2008 assault, and one related to a December 12, 2008
assault. In Case Number 09-0857, the Commission denied the
April 21 application as untimely (“Case 857”),
and, in Case Number 09-0858, the Commission voted to pay
Andrews's medical bills that were submitted with the
December 12 application (“Case 858”). Andrews
appealed both of the Commission's decisions through the
state courts, but the appeals were ultimately unsuccessful.
[Id. at 4-6.] While Andrews's appeals were
pending, Plaintiff wrote letters to the Commission, arguing
that, in both application processes and cases, the Commission
discriminated against Andrews based on his disability.
Plaintiff requested accommodations and/or modifications to
the Commission's procedures, including the reopening of
Andrews's cases. The Commission declined to act upon the
letters, responding that the issues Plaintiff identified were
previously considered by the Commission and the state courts.
[Id. at 6-8.]
instant case, Plaintiff argued the Commission discriminated
against Andrews based on his disability when it denied the
application in Case 857 and when it reduced the benefits that
it initially approved in Case 858. [Id. at 8-9.] In
the 7/22/19 Order, this Court ruled that, applying either the
ADA's two-year statute of limitations or the ADAAA's
four-year statute of limitations, the portion of the Title II
Claim based on the Commission's denial in Case 857 was
timed-barred. [Id. at 20.] This Court also
ruled that the portion of the Title II Claim arising from
Case 858 accrued as of August 5, 2011. [Id. at 26.]
Plaintiff's equitable tolling and continuing violation
arguments were rejected as to both cases, and summary
judgment was granted in favor of Defendant on the ground that
Plaintiff's Title II Claim was time-barred. [Id.
at 28-30.] Even if Plaintiff's Title II Claim was timely,
summary judgment still would have been granted in favor of
Defendant because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. [Id. at 30-34.]
instant Motion, Plaintiff seeks relief from the Judgment
because of the following alleged errors in the 7/22/19 Order:
1) the Court erred in basing its time-bar analysis on
Andrews's August 5, 2011 appeal of the Commission's
decision and order in Case 857 (“Case 857
Decision”) because the decision was not part of the
summary judgment record in this case; 2) the Court ignored
Plaintiff's evidence of bias on behalf of the
Commission's investigator in Case 858; 3) the Court erred
in ruling that Plaintiff's claims were time-barred
because the six-year statute of limitations applied because
of fraudulent concealment, pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. §
657-20; and 4) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
did not apply in this case because Plaintiff did not seek to
undo any state court judgment.
brings the instant Motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1),
which states: “On motion and just terms, the court may
relieve a party or its legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect[.]” This district court has recognized that
“[r]econsideration pursuant to Rule 60 is generally
appropriate upon a showing of one of three grounds: (1) the
availability of new evidence; (2) an intervening change in
controlling law; and (3) the need to correct clear error or
prevent manifest injustice.” Ferretti v. Beach Club
Maui, Inc., Civ. No. 18-00012 JMS-RLP, 2018 WL 3672741,
at *1 (D. Hawai`i Aug. 2, 2018) (citing Sch. Dist. No.
1J, Multnomah Cty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263
(9th Cir. 1993)). The Motion does not identify any newly
available evidence nor any intervening changes in the law.
Therefore, the only issues before this Court are whether
there was clear error in the 7/22/19 Order and whether the
7/22/19 Order was manifestly unjust.
Plaintiff's Second Motion for Relief from
November 5, 2019, Plaintiff filed a document titled
“Second Motion for Relief from Judgment.” [Dkt.
no. 158.] On November 8, 2019, an entering order was issued,
stating the merits of that motion would not be considered
until after the instant Motion was resolved. [Dkt. no. 159.]
However, upon further review, the Court finds that
Plaintiff's November 5 filing is not a motion for
separate relief, but a supplemental memorandum in support of
the instant Motion. Plaintiff's November 5 filing also
addresses the statute of limitations issues that are
addressed in the instant Motion. The Court finds that it is
unnecessary for Defendant to file a response to the
Clerk's Office is HEREBY DIRECTED to revise the docket
entry for Plaintiff's November 5 filing to reflect that
it is not a motion, but a ...