United States District Court, D. Hawaii
STEPHEN K. MAKANANI, #A3007102, Plaintiff,
NEAL WAGUTSUMA, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND AND
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
A. OTAKE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is pro se Plaintiff Stephen K. Makanani's
(“Makanani['s]”) Prisoner Civil Rights
Complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No.
1 (Compl.). Makanani alleges that Defendants violated his
constitutional rights as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments during a prison misconduct
proceeding and the later institution of criminal charges
against him. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at
Supp. to Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at 2-3.
following reasons, the Complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(a) for Makanani's failure to state a
colorable claim for relief. Should Makanani file an amended
complaint, he is also ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why the Court
should not abstain from adjudicating his claims against Kauai
County Prosecutor Kollar.
Court is required to screen all civil prisoner pleadings that
“seek redress from a governmental entity[, ]
officer[, ] or employee[.]” 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a). Claims or complaints that are frivolous or
malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek damages
from defendants who are immune from suit must be dismissed.
See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir.
2000) (en banc); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002,
1004 (9th Cir. 2010).
under § 1915A(a) involves the same standard of review as
that used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th
Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a
complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). A claim is “plausible” when the facts
alleged in the complaint would support a reasonable inference
that the plaintiff is entitled to relief from a specific
defendant for specific misconduct. See id.
8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“requires only ‘a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (citation omitted). The “mere possibility of
misconduct, ” or an “unadorned, the
defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation” falls short
of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. at 678-79
(citations omitted); see also Moss v. U.S. Secret
Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action”; it requires factual allegations sufficient
“to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations
omitted). “All that is required is that the complaint
gives ‘the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the ground upon which it
rests.'” Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121,
1129 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett
Packard Co., 941 F.2d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 1991)).
litigants' pleadings must be liberally construed and all
doubts should be resolved in their favor. See Hebbe v.
Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations
omitted). The court must grant leave to amend if it appears
the plaintiff can correct the defects in the complaint.
See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. If a claim or complaint
cannot be saved by amendment, however, dismissal with
prejudice is appropriate. See Sylvia Landfield Tr. v.
City of Los Angeles, 729 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir.
claims that Defendants violated his rights by
“conducting a coer[c]ed administration investigation .
. . without a warr[a]nt or sub[p]oena turned it over to
prosecution and testif[i]ed in open court.” Supp. to
Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at 1. Specifically, he alleges that KCCC
Defendants threatened to transfer him to HCF during
misconduct proceedings regarding an alleged sexual assault
that occurred while Makanani was on furlough from KCCC,
searched for evidence “outside of the prison
facilities, ” failed to warn him against
self-incrimination as allegedly required by Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),  denied him counsel, and
conspired with Prosecutor Kollar to label him a sex offender.
Compl., ECF No. 1 at 5-7.
the misconduct proceedings at KCCC, Makanani admitted that he
had consensual sex with a woman while on a prison
furlough and was found guilty of a prison infraction. As a
result, Makanani's institutional “points”
were increased, he lost his job, was removed from the KCCC
Lifetime Stand Program, and was transferred to HCF. Makanani
claims this subjected him to “atypical and
signi[fi]cant hardship in relation to everyday life in
prison.” Id. at 7. He also claims that Warden
Wagutsuma discriminated against him by informing the Lifetime
Stand Program about his prison misconduct violation.
next claims that Prosecutor Kollar discriminated against him
by speaking to the news media about Makanani's alleged
involvement in the sexual assault before Makanani's
arrest. Makanani alleges this denied him a fair trial.
See Id. at 6; see also Supp. to Compl., ECF
No. 1-1 at 3 (“How can I have a right to a fare [sic]
trial when the prosecutor talk to the media [n]ews [r]adieo
[sic] station and news paper [sic] about this crime before I
seeks use immunity for statements that he made at the prison
misconduct hearing to preclude their use in his criminal
prosecution,  declaratory and injunctive relief, and
compensatory and punitive damages.
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged
violation was committed by a person acting under the color of
state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
1983 requires an actual connection or link between a
defendant's actions and the plaintiff's alleged
deprivation. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.
362, 371-72, 377 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d
165, 167 (9th Cir. 1980). “A person
‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a
constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if
he does an affirmative act, participates in another's
affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is
legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which
complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d
740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). A plaintiff must
allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of a
particular defendant's conduct, and an affirmative link
between that injury and the alleged violation of his rights.
Claims against Director Espinda and Mayor Kawakami
officials are not liable under § 1983 for the actions of
their subordinates “on any theory of vicarious
liability.” Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d
967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). However,
“a prison official in a supervisory position may be
held liable under § 1983 if he was personally involved
in the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal
connection exists between his unlawful conduct and the
constitutional violation.” Lemire v. Cal. Dep't
of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1085 (9th Cir.
2013) (citation omitted). A causal connection can be shown
through the supervisor's: (1) own culpable action or
inaction in the training, supervision, or control of
subordinates; (2) acquiescence in the constitutional
deprivation about which a complaint is made; or (3) conduct
that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights
of others. See id.; Henry A. v. Willden,
678 F.3d 991, 1004 (9th Cir. 2012). Liability may also be
imposed “if supervisory officials implement a policy so
deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of
constitutional rights and is the moving force of the
constitutional violation.” Hansen v. Black,
885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); see Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977.
alleges no personal action or inaction by Director Espinda or
Mayor Kawakami connecting them to his claims or to any
violation of his constitutional rights. Nothing in the
Complaint suggests that Mayor Kawakami has a supervisory role
over inmates housed at KCCC, which is operated by DPS. And,
Makanani alleges no facts showing that Director Espinda was
aware of or personally involved with Makanani's
misconduct proceedings, failed to adequately train or
supervise his subordinates, or implemented a constitutionally
deficient policy that caused the alleged constitutional
fails to state a colorable claim for relief against Director
Espinda or Mayor Kawakami and his claims against them are
DISMISSED with leave to amend.
broadly alleges that this action arises under “rights
guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.” Supp. to the Compl., ECF
No. 1-1 at 2. To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a
prisoner must satisfy two elements: (1) “the
deprivation must be, objectively, sufficiently
serious;” and (2) “prison official[s] must have a
sufficiently culpable state of mind, ” that is,
“one of deliberate indifference.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Prison officials act with
deliberate indifference when they know of and disregard an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety. See Id.
alleges that he lost his job, was removed from the Lifetime
Stand Program, and was transferred to HCF. He alleges no
facts showing that KCCC Defendants acted with deliberate
indifference to any objectively serious, known risk to his
health or safety when they sanctioned him and transferred him
to HCF. Similarly, nothing within the Complaint suggests that
Prosecutor Kollar violated the Eighth Amendment.
Makanani's Eighth Amendment claim is DISMISSED with leave